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ABSTRACT  
The false dichotomy between achieving diversity and rewarding merit frequently 
surfaces in discussions about decisions on university and law school admissions, 
scholarships, law licenses, jobs, and promotions.  “Merit” judgments are often based 
on the results of standardized tests meant to predict who has the best chance to 
succeed if given the opportunity to do so. This Article criticizes over-reliance on 
standardized tests and responds to suggestions that challenging the use of such tests 
reflects a race-comes-first approach that chooses diversity over merit.   Discussing 
the firefighter exam that led to the Supreme Court decision in Ricci v. DiStefano, as 
well as the LSAT and Bar Exam, the Article questions the way standardized tests are 
used in making critical gateway decisions.  It argues, consistent with Title VII, that 
racially disparate test outcomes should prompt inquiry into whether better ways exist 
to determine merit.  Based on studies indicating that cognitive tests predict academic 
and workplace success for a relatively small percentage of test-takers, and on 
research into assessing a wider range of skills in many fields, the Article suggests we 
can both better predict who will succeed as future lawyers and reduce the impact of 
test score racial disparities by modifying law school admissions and bar licensing 
processes. The Article concludes that questioning over-reliance on cognitive tests to 
measure merit will lead to the development of better assessment measures with more 
diverse outcomes, more fairness for all applicants, and more comprehensive 
decision-making processes that better reflect true merit.    
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I. INTRODUCTION 
eginning as early as 2002, commentators have urged re-
examination of the use of standardized tests and the role they play 
in hiring, promotion, licensing, and admissions decisions because of 
the limited ability of those tests to predict academic and job success, 
combined with their disparate impact on racial minorities.1 In Does 
Testing = Race Discrimination?: Ricci, the Bar Exam, the LSAT, and 
the Challenge to Learning,2 Professor Dan Subotnik argues that such 
challenges to the reliance on standardized tests equate to a race-comes-
first approach that chooses diversity over intellectual ability and 
economic growth.3 He suggests that the failure to use test scores as a 
                                                            
1 See, e.g., Robert J. Sternberg, The Rainbow Project: Enhancing the SAT through 
Assessments of Analytical, Practical, and Creative Skills, 34 INTELLIGENCE 321 
(2006) (arguing for augmenting the SAT with assessments that measure a wider 
range of skills) [hereinafter Sternberg, Rainbow Project]; Robert J. Sternberg 
and Jennifer Hedlund, Practical Intelligence, g, and Work Psychology, 15 
HUMAN PERFORMANCE 143 (2002) (arguing that researchers and employers 
should look beyond general intelligence tests to predict successful job 
performance); Marjorie M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer 
Effectiveness: Broadening the Basis for Law School Admission Decisions, 36 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 620 (2011) (suggesting ways to supplement the LSAT to 
account for a broader range of lawyering effectiveness factors); SALT, 
Statement on the Bar Exam, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 446 (2002) (arguing for re-
examination of the bar exam); Kristin Booth Glen, When and Where We Enter: 
Rethinking Admission to the Legal Profession, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1696 (2002) 
(arguing for re-thinking the bar exam); Phoebe A. Haddon & Deborah W. Post, 
Misuse and Abuse of the LSAT: Making the Case for Alternative Evaluative 
Efforts and a Redefinition of Merit, 80 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 41 (2006) (arguing for 
re-evaluation of the LSAT as one of the main law school admissions criteria). 
2 Dan Subotnik, Does Testing = Race Discrimination?: Ricci, The Bar Exam, the 
LSAT, and the Challenge to Learning, 8 U. MASS. L. REV. 332 (2013). 
3 See, e.g., id. at 398 (suggesting that those who critique standardized tests 
undermine the pursuit of knowledge and devalue intellectual achievement); id. 
at 344 (arguing that it hurts the economy when jobs go to people not best suited, 
and implying that test scores are a measure of who is best suited for a given job); 
id. at 346 (arguing that a “society that belittles knowledge and learning can pay 
a high economic price” and again implying that critiquing standardized test 
scores equates to belittling knowledge and learning); id. at 394 (arguing that 
concern over affirmative action and disparate impact results in “costs that are 
incurred not only by those who fail to get jobs for which they are better qualified 
but also by the entire society.”); id. at 395 (arguing that those who question the 
validity of the LSAT and Bar Exam as a gateway to the profession “pooh pooh 
the importance of learning and educational achievement in economic life”). 
B
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key determinant of who gets hired, promoted, admitted to universities 
and law schools, and licensed is unfair to individuals,4 economically 
damaging to society,5 and serves a postmodern vision that considers 
merit-testing as merely perpetuating the status of the powerful.6 
Professor Subotnik’s arguments repeat and reinforce commonly held 
beliefs about fairness and merit,7 but those arguments and beliefs are 
grounded in flawed assumptions and present a false dichotomy 
between the twin goals of achieving diversity and identifying qualified 
individuals. We write this response to address those flaws, to explicate 
a more nuanced view of the value of cognitive tests, and to support a 
broader, and more just, understanding of merit. 
Standardized testing was introduced in the United States in an 
effort to ensure that hiring, promotion, admissions, and other important 
decisions about access to programs and jobs would be made based on 
objective criteria, not based on subjective judgments that could—and 
had been—infected by bias and discrimination and other irrelevant 
factors.8 Those who performed well on the tests were presumed to be 
                                                            
4 Id. at 339 (arguing that New Haven’s refusal to certify job promotion tests that 
had a disparate impact was unfair to the white firefighters who took the test); id. 
at 381 (arguing that moving from an admissions standard that looks at individual 
LSAT scores to one that looks at score ranges is “unfair at the individual level”). 
5 See id. at 394 (arguing that failure to rely upon cognitive tests to make hiring 
decisions and failure to focus on increasing cognitive test scores is economically 
harmful). 
6 Id. at 354–57. 
7 See Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action, Reclaiming the American 
Ideal, 84 CAL L. REV. 953, 960–61 (1996). Guiner notes that: 
[the] stock story of affirmative action critics in the employment 
context (and the one that appears most often in the cases) is of the 
white civil servant—say a police officer or firefighter—John Doe. 
He scored several points higher on the civil service exam and 
interview rating process, but lost out to a woman or person of color 
who did not score as high on those selection criteria. John Doe 
claims, along with many public opponents of affirmative action, 
that he is more qualified for the job, and that it is unfair to allow 
race or gender considerations to deprive him of what he ‘deserves.’  
Id. 
8 Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of 
our Democratic Ideas, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 131–32 (2003); Soohan Kim, 
Alexandra Kalev, & Frank Dobbin, Progressive Corporations at Work: The 
Case of Diversity Programs, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 171, 192 
(2012); Haddon & Post, supra note 1, at 45. Although the general understanding 
 
210 UMass Law Review v. 9 | 206 
best qualified and therefore to deserve placement in gifted programs, 
entry into elite schools, and the award of scholarships, jobs and 
promotions.9 Despite such laudable goals, however, standardized test 
results are far from infallible predictors of who is likely to succeed.10 
Too much reliance on test scores to measure merit discounts or ignores 
the fact that standardized tests measure only one aspect of 
intelligence,11 are correlated with income and parental education,12 and 
produce results that may be skewed because of contextual cues related 
more to outcome expectations than to actual ability.13 
                                                                                                                                            
is that standardized testing was adopted to avoid bias, as noted in the text, at 
least one commentator has expressed a different view, suggesting that tests like 
the SAT were adopted to “create[] a path to upward mobility and national 
leadership for intelligent men of middle class means” while allowing continued 
exclusion of applicants of different gender and racial and ethnic backgrounds. 
Kimberly West-Faulcon, More Intelligent Design: Testing Measures of Merit, 
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1235, 1260–61 (2011). 
9 Guinier, supra note 8, at 132; see also Michael Selmi, Understanding 
Discrimination in a “Post-Racial” World, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 833, 851 (2011) 
(noting that in Ricci, the Court “viewed test results as consistent with their 
expectations: to the Court, it was to be expected that the white firefighters would 
perform better than the minority firefighters and the results were explained by 
their hard work and superiority rather than by problems with the test”). 
10 See infra Parts V.A–B, VI.A (discussing the limited ability of standardized tests 
to predict academic success and job performance). 
11 See infra Parts V.C, VI.A (discussing various aspects of intelligence beyond 
cognitive intelligence and how those forms of intelligence also help predict 
academic and job success). 
12 See College Admissions Show Test Driven Schooling Fails, FAIRTEST 
EXAMINER (Fall, 2013) http://www.fairtest.org/college-admissions-tests-show-
testdriven-schooling (compiling data on SAT test scores by family income); 
Joseph A. Soares, Private Paradigm Constrains Public Response to Twenty 
First Century Challenges, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 427, 436–37 (2013) 
(discussing evidence of significant correlation between SAT scores and parental 
income while finding little correlation between high school GPA and parental 
income and arguing that admissions based upon test scores is a “form of Social 
Darwinism with social selection for high income families disguised as academic 
selection for the best talent”); Lucille A. Jewel, Merit and Mobility, 43 U. MEM. 
L. REV. 239, 270 (2012) (noting that the “children of college educated parents 
score 150 points higher on the SAT than children whose parents are high-school 
dropouts”). 
13 Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test 
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 
(1995) (discussing findings that perception of racial stereotypes can affect 
standardized test performance of African American students). Steele’s work has 
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Because standardized tests are an imperfect measure of ability and 
success, we must learn to look beyond performance on traditional 
standardized tests as we conceptualize merit and allocate important 
human capital resources. Abilities and attributes beyond those 
measured by standardized tests should be part of the equation. 
Research indicates we can test more than cognitive ability and when 
we do so, we increase the ability to predict who will succeed. When 
we give undue weight to cognitive test scores, we may award jobs and 
admissions slots to those who may not actually be the best qualified or 
we may exclude those who are equally capable of academic and job 
performance but who do not perform well on standardized tests.14 
And what about achieving diversity, which Professor Subotnik 
suggests is the result-oriented basis for challenges to standardized 
testing? Concern about racially skewed test outcomes is indeed a 
reason why some have questioned the legitimacy of standardized tests, 
but such questioning is entirely appropriate, especially if it results in 
better tests as well as more diverse—and more fair—outcomes. 
Achieving fair and appropriate decision-making—not achieving racial 
balance—is the goal, but racial imbalance in outcomes is reason 
enough to explore the validity of the tests. 
In this Article, we address the misconception that standardized 
tests should be the key determinant in deciding who gets an 
admissions slot, a job or promotion, or admitted into law practice. We 
do not advocate ignoring such test results, but instead suggest that it is 
unfair and unreasonable to place undue weight upon tests that do not 
measure the full range of relevant abilities and are considerably less 
predictive than assumed. We posit that the limited predictive ability of 
standardized tests, combined with their disparate impact, is reason to 
re-examine the tests and search for better alternatives. 
We begin, as Professor Subotnik did, with a discussion of Ricci v. 
DiStefano,15 a case in which white firefighters sued the City of New 
Haven for its failure to certify the results of a job promotion exam that 
had a disparate impact. Ricci serves as the foundation upon which 
                                                                                                                                            
been both widely cited and validated. For an overview of the literature on 
stereotype threat, see Clark D. Cunningham et al., Passing Strict Scrutiny: Using 
Social Science to Design Affirmative Action Programs, 90 GEO. L. J. 835, 839 
(2002). 
14 See infra Parts V.B, VI.A (discussing studies which indicate standardized test 
scores alone are not the best predictors of academic or job performance success). 
15 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
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Professor Subotnik builds his argument that our society values 
“diversity above qualifications.”16 In Part II, we offer a different vision 
of Ricci, supported by the law of Title VII and the facts on the ground 
in New Haven. We explain why Ricci is a case in which the employer, 
faced with disparate impact, made the reasonable decision to explore 
the validity of the challenged test and the availability of better methods 
of assessing who was most qualified to perform the job. In Parts III 
and IV, we challenge Professor Subotnik’s conclusions about the 
appropriate response to the disparate impact of bar examination 
results, exploring the validity of the current test and the availability of 
alternatives. We suggest that the limited predictive abilities of the bar 
exam, combined with its disparate impact, present cogent reasons to 
examine whether better assessment alternatives exist, and we discuss 
several alternatives that may be, or have been, adopted. In Part V, we 
consider similar questions with respect to the Law School Admission 
Test. In Part VI, we respond to Professor Subotnik’s claims that 
challenging and supplementing traditional cognitive tests undermines 
economic development. Finally, in Part VII, we address directly the 
racial performance gap—the disparate impact that leads to the very 
different conclusions that Professor Subotnik and we reach. We 
conclude as we began, with our assertion that questioning the validity 
and comprehensiveness of the bar exam, the LSAT, and cognitive job 
tests is not anti-intellectual, as he suggests.17 Rather, exploration of 
better assessment methods embodies the truly intellectual approach to 
the question of who, in a society with limited resources, should reap its 
rewards. 
II. RICCI V. DISTEFANO AND DISPARATE IMPACT 
Professor Subotnik uses the 2009 Supreme Court case of Ricci v. 
DiStefano as the foundation for his discussion of the “legal, political, 
and moral challenges to testing”18 and as a prime example of his claim 
that those who question the legitimacy of tests that have a 
disproportionate negative impact upon people of color believe that 
                                                            
16 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 339; id. at 344. 
17 Id. at 369–70 (arguing that SALT’s critiques of the bar exam equate to favoring 
diversity over learning); id. at 395 (arguing that those who question the validity 
of the LSAT and Bar Exam as a gateway to the profession “pooh pooh the 
importance of learning and educational achievement in economic life”). 
18 Id. at 347. 
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“racial balance is the axis upon which our system of justice must 
turn.”19 Noting that the City would not have thrown out the test if there 
had not been a disparate impact on firefighters of color,20 Professor 
Subotnik argues that New Haven invalidated its own tests in order to 
produce “black winners”21 and that doing so unfairly penalized mostly 
white firefighters who studied hard to pass the test. Thus, according to 
Professor Subotnik, Ricci illustrates the principle that some people 
value “diversity above all.”22 
We, too, begin with a discussion of Ricci, because the 
understanding—and misunderstanding—of that case is fundamental to 
the discussion of what it means to challenge the use of tests that 
produce race-based gaps in outcomes. Ricci is not, as Professor 
Subotnik claims, a case of “diversity above all.” Rather, it is a case 
that demonstrates a very real struggle to ensure that a job promotion 
test that produces a disparate impact is, in fact, both valid and the best 
available measure of job qualifications. Whether one agrees with the 
outcome in Ricci—and four Justices did not, a nuance lost in Professor 
Subotnik’s description—the circumstances that led to the litigation 
should be seen as an example of grappling with the hard issues 
surrounding the use of standardized testing, not as an illustration of 
choosing diversity over merit. 
A. The Appropriate Response to Disparate Impact 
The Ricci decision reviewed the actions of the City of New Haven 
after it administered promotion examinations for fire department 
supervisor positions. African American firefighters made up thirty 
percent of the City’s firefighters and nine percent of those ranked 
captain and above.23 The promotion test results produced significant 
and unexpected racial disparities24 and, if certified, would have 
resulted in no African American members of the department being 
eligible for promotion to either lieutenant or captain.25 Because such a 
disparate impact can result in Title VII liability if the employer cannot 
                                                            
19 Id. at 339. 
20 Id. at 332. 
21 Id. at 339. 
22 Id. at 353. 
23 Ricci v. DiStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 610–11 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
24 Brief for Respondent at 4, Ricci v. DiStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
25 Id. 
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show that the test is job-related and a matter of business necessity and 
rebut any showing by the plaintiff that there are less racially disparate 
alternatives,26 the City embarked upon an investigation to determine 
whether the test was a valid measure of firefighting leadership and 
whether there were equally valid, or better, ways to test for the 
positions that would have less of an adverse impact.27 
The City’s investigation produced evidence that such better 
alternatives did exist.28 Based upon the results of its investigation, the 
City refused to certify the test results.29 Frank Ricci, seventeen other 
white firefighters, and one Hispanic firefighter, all of whom had 
achieved high scores on the promotion tests, filed suit alleging that 
negating the test results was a racially discriminatory act against the 
white firefighters in violation of the disparate treatment provisions in 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which forbids intentional 
discrimination.30 The lawsuit thus claimed that the City’s actions 
undertaken to avoid liability for disparate impact resulted in disparate 
treatment forbidden by Title VII. 
In a 5-4 ruling, the Court decided in favor of the plaintiffs, finding 
that the refusal to certify the test results violated Title VII’s disparate 
treatment prohibition despite the tests’ disparate impact.31 In the view 
                                                            
26 The city was concerned about disparate impact liability, which arises not based 
on acts of intentional discrimination (though those also are forbidden) but based 
on unexplained or unjustified disparities in impact based on race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. Plaintiffs may establish a prima facie case of disparate 
impact by demonstrating that a facially neutral standard has a disproportionately 
adverse effect on minorities. Once plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to “demonstrate that the challenged practice is job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012). If the defendant establishes the practice or 
test is job related and consistent with business necessity, plaintiffs may still 
prevail on a disparate impact claim if they can prove that a viable alternative 
existed that had less of a discriminatory impact and that the employer failed to 
adopt that alternative. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii)(2012). Disparate impact 
analysis was first established in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) 
and has since been enacted into the text of Title VII itself. 
27 See supra discussion of the legal standard in note 26. For a discussion of the 
city’s actions, see infra text accompanying notes 44–62. 
28 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 572. 
29 Id. at 572–74. 
30 Id. at 575. 
31 See id. at 583. The majority and dissent in Ricci disagreed about the appropriate 
legal rule to use in resolving the conflict created by the statute’s mandates to 
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of the majority, the tests were clearly job-related and consistent with 
business necessity under the analysis applicable to disparate impact 
claims, and the City had an insufficient evidentiary basis to establish 
that there were equally valid, less discriminatory alternatives that 
served the City’s needs.32 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the four 
dissenters, disagreed with these evidentiary findings, believing that the 
majority “ignores substantial evidence of multiple flaws in the tests 
New Haven used. The Court similarly fails to acknowledge the better 
tests used in other cities, which have yielded less racially skewed 
outcomes.”33 
In Ricci, the City questioned the test’s validity as the decisive 
factor in promotion because of the disparate impact of the test results. 
Professor Subotnik objects to “the peculiar circumstance that [New 
Haven] invalidated its own test for reasons of race.”34 Yet Title VII is 
designed to produce exactly that result—to cause remedial action to be 
taken, either voluntarily or compelled by a court judgment, when a 
seemingly neutral practice or policy leads to a disparate racial impact 
that is not justified. Federal regulations make this clear: “Whenever 
the user is shown an alternative selection procedure with evidence of 
less adverse impact and substantial evidence of validity for the same 
job in similar circumstances, the user should investigate it to determine 
the appropriateness of using or validating it in accord with these 
guidelines.”35 Examination of conduct that may violate a legal 
                                                                                                                                            
avoid both kinds of discrimination. The majority thought that an employer 
should only be able to avoid disparate treatment liability if it could show that it 
had a “strong basis in evidence” that, without such action, it would be liable 
because of the disparate impact of the test results. Id. The dissenters thought an 
employer should only have to show that it had good cause to believe the test that 
produced the disparate impact would not be allowable as a business necessity. 
Id. at 625 (“an employer who jettisons a selection device when its 
disproportionate racial impact becomes apparent does not violate Title VII’s 
disparate-treatment bar automatically or at all, subject to this key condition: The 
employer must have good cause to believe the device would not withstand 
examination for business necessity.”). 
32 Id. at 585, 587. 
33 Id. at 608–09 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
34 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 347. 
35 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3. This regulation states: 
[W]henever a validity study is called for by these guidelines, the 
user should include, as a part of the validity study, an investigation 
of suitable alternative selection procedures and suitable alternative 
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prohibition against discrimination is exactly what disparate impact 
legal rules mandate.36 Concern about disparate impact liability has 
played a significant role in raising employers’ awareness of the need to 
examine, and potentially reform, employment practices that have 
“inhibited the economic advance of women and minorities.”37 
Investigating the validity of a test because it has an unintentional 
disparate impact does not equate to having racial balance be the “axis 
on which our system of justice must turn.”38 Rather, it is recognition 
that when an examination produces an unintentional racial disparity,39 
it should prompt scrutiny of that test and a review of viable 
alternatives. As the New Haven City attorney noted, “significant 
adverse impact . . . triggers a much closer review [of the test], because 
it’s like setting off a warning bell that there may be something 
wrong.”40 
                                                                                                                                            
methods of using the selection procedure which have as little 
adverse impact as possible, to determine the appropriateness of 
using or validating them in accord with these guidelines. If a user 
has made a reasonable effort to become aware of such alternative 
procedures and validity has been demonstrated in accord with 
these guidelines, the use of the test or other selection procedure 
may continue until such time as it should reasonably be reviewed 
for currency. Whenever the user is shown an alternative selection 
procedure with evidence of less adverse impact and substantial 
evidence of validity for the same job in similar circumstances, the 
user should investigate it to determine the appropriateness of using 
or validating it in accord with these guidelines. This subsection is 
not intended to preclude the combination of procedures into a 
significantly more valid procedure, if the use of such a 
combination has been shown to be in compliance with the 
guidelines.  
Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2157, 
2158 (2013). 
38 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 339. 
39 On the captain exam, the white candidate pass rate was 64% compared to a 
37.5% pass rate for both black and Hispanic test-takers. On the lieutenant exam, 
white candidates had a pass rate of 58.1%; black candidates had a pass rate of 
31.6%; and Hispanic candidates had a pass rate of 20%. Ricci v. DiStefano, 557 
U.S. 557, 586 (2009). 
40 Brief for Respondent, supra note 24, at 7. 
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When the test’s results indicated a disparate impact, the City 
should have acted exactly as it did: scrutinized the test to ensure that 
the test was the best available measure of potential success in the 
firefighting leadership positions. This scrutiny not only comports with 
the legal standard,41 it comports with the need to ensure the testing 
process itself was fair and resulted in the best possible firefighter 
leaders.42 The fact that some outside groups pressed the City to 
respond to the test’s disparate impact, highlighted by the majority 
opinion and by Professor Subotnik,43 does not mean the City acted 
inappropriately in attending to those concerns. While the Supreme 
Court decided the City had insufficient basis for acting—a conclusion 
rejected by four Supreme Court Justices—the City cannot be charged 
with discarding the test simply because the outcome was not what it 
hoped it would be, as Professor Subotnik claims. 
B. What was Wrong with the Ricci Test? 
What did the City of New Haven do, and what should any 
employer do, when confronted with racial gaps in test results? Both to 
ensure fairness and to forestall legal liability, an employer offering 
rewards—hiring, promotion, or other benefits—on the basis of test 
outcomes must ensure that the tests are valid and reliable measures, 
that they measure the qualifications necessary, and that there are no 
alternative measures that do both of those tasks without creating 
significant racial imbalances. 
That is precisely the inquiry made by the City of New Haven.44 In 
Ricci, there was evidence presented to the City and to the trial court 
                                                            
41 Title VII prohibits employment practices that have a discriminatory impact if 
better assessment alternatives are available. See supra note 26. 
42 As the Ricci dissent notes, “[f]irefighting is a profession in which the legacy of 
racial discrimination casts an especially long shadow. . . . The [U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights] Report singled out police and fire departments for 
having ‘[b]arriers to equal employment . . . greater . . . than in any other State or 
local government . . . .” Ricci, 557 U.S. at 609–10 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
Diversity in the firefighting force helps develop firehouse camaraderie, 
promotes sharing of information, tolerance, and mutual respect among 
colleagues, and builds knowledge of diverse communities within the city. See 
Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 309 (2006). The City’s tests failed to 
assess many of the skills and qualities that indicate who will be the best 
firefighting lieutenants and captains. See infra text accompanying notes 48–55. 
43 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 598; Subotnik, supra note 2, at 339. 
44 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 613 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
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that the exams were not the best measure of who would be the most 
qualified firefighter lieutenants and captains, and that more accurate, 
and less discriminatory, assessment alternatives did exist.45 For 
example, one key deficiency in the promotion exams was their failure 
to assess command presence and the ability to quickly assess and 
respond to changing and often confusing events.46 During a fire, 
leaders must be able “to act decisively, to communicate orders clearly 
and thoroughly to personnel on the scene, and to maintain a sense of 
confidence and calm even in the midst of intense anxiety, confusion 
and pain.”47 The New Haven exams did not attempt to measure 
command presence; they were designed to measure only job-related 
knowledge.48 This failure to measure a critical skill meant that “a high 
test score thus could not support an inference that the candidate would 
be a good commander in the line of duty; conversely, those candidates 
with strong command attributes were never given an opportunity to 
demonstrate them.”49 The New Haven tests also failed to measure 
proficiency in interpersonal relations, supervisory skills, and the ability 
to function under dangerous circumstances.50 While it is true that 
knowledge of fire science is important to a commander, the highest 
scorer on the exam is not necessarily the best qualified firefighting 
leader. As the City attorney noted, “the goal of the test is to decide 
who is going to be a good supervisor ultimately, not who is going to be 
a good test-taker.”51 
There was evidence that some of the deficiency in the scope of the 
multiple choice portion of the test could have been addressed by 
                                                            
45 See Brief for Industrial Organizational Psychologists as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 12, Ricci v. DiStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (Nos. 
07-1428, 08-328), 2009 WL 795281 (“Virtually all studies of fire management 
emphasize that command presence is vital to the safety of firefighters at the 
scene and to the successful accomplishment of the firefighting mission and the 
safety of the public.”) [hereinafter IOP Brief]. 
46 See id.; Richard B. Gasaway, Making Intuitive Decisions Under Stress: 
Understanding Fireground Incident Command Decision-Making, 1 INT’L FIRE 
SERV. J. OF LEADERSHIP & MGMT. 8 (2007). 
47 IOP brief supra note 45, at 11 (citing RICHARD KOLOMAY & ROBERT HOFF, 
FIREFIGHTER RESCUE & SURVIVAL 5–13 (2003)). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 12. 
50 See Ricci v. DiStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 634 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
51 IOP brief, supra note 45, at 12. 
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weighing the oral exam more heavily—60% oral and 40% written 
rather than the reverse, as it was weighed.52 The over-emphasis on the 
multiple choice questions was exacerbated by the admittedly arbitrary 
seventy percent cut-off passing score required under the City’s civil 
service rules53 and by the decision of the City’s test consultant, 
Industrial/Organizational Solutions, Inc. (IOS), to design more 
difficult test questions to screen out more people.54 These choices 
skewed the test toward the “attenuated set of knowledge and abilities 
that are measured by a multiple choice test” and increased the adverse 
impact on minority candidates by ignoring other knowledge, skills, 
attitudes, and other personal characteristics needed to be a fire 
officer.55 
If the test—while reliable and valid to evaluate the narrow set of 
traits it set out to measure—did not accurately identify the best 
candidates for promotion, were alternative tests available that could do 
so, and without a significant racial gap in outcomes? The answer, 
based on experience in other communities, was yes.56 Because of the 
problems with paper-and-pencil tests, over two-thirds of the country’s 
municipalities rely on other testing methods, including the use of 
assessment centers.57 Rather than employing oral or multiple choice 
exams, assessment centers use simulations of real-world situations that 
require test-takers to demonstrate how they would address the problem 
in real life58 and employ job simulations to test command presence.59 
For those municipalities that still partly relied on written exams, “the 
median weight assigned to them was 30 percent—half the weight 
                                                            
52 See Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening 
Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 151 at Table 5 
(2010). The arbitrary weighting of test sections affected white, as well as 
minority, promotion candidates. Id. at 133–35. 
53 IOP brief, supra note 45, at 17. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 18–19. 
56 See Ricci v. DiStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 634–35 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 570–71 (2009). 
59 IOP brief, supra note 45, at 31–32 (citing Diana E. Krause et al., Incremental 
Validity of Assessment Center Ratings Over Cognitive Ability Tests: A Study at 
the Executive Management Level, 14 INT'L J. SELECTION & ASSESSMENT 360, 
362 (2006)). 
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given to New Haven’s written exam.”60 The New Haven Civil Service 
Board heard testimony about these alternative methods and learned 
that these methods “were both more reliable and notably less 
discriminatory” than the process used by New Haven.61 As the dissent 
in Ricci noted, “A test fashioned from materials pertaining to the 
job . . .superficially may seem job-related. But the issue is whether it 
demonstrably selects people who will perform better [all of] the 
required on-the-job behaviors.”62 
Despite evidence that the New Haven tests were seriously flawed 
as a measure of fire officer qualifications—enough to convince the 
four dissenters—the Ricci majority concluded that discarding the test 
results was unfair to those with high scores because it upset their 
“legitimate expectations” of promotion if they performed well on the 
test.63 Professor Subotnik reaches a similar conclusion.64 This 
reasoning is backwards. Legitimate expectations depend upon a 
legitimate selection method.65 As Justice Ginsburg stated, “If an 
employer reasonably concludes that an exam fails to identify the most 
qualified individuals and needlessly shuts out a segment of the 
applicant pool, Title VII surely does not compel the employer to hire 
or promote based on the test, however unreliable it may be.”66 
In hindsight, no one disputes that it would have been preferable for 
the City to have more expansively investigated testing methods prior 
to administering the test or to have given the test company authority to 
explore a full range of testing rather than constraining them to work 
within narrower parameters.67 It was unfair to the firefighters who 
studied for a test that was not the best measure of qualification for 
promotion to later dash their expectations when they scored highly on 
that test. But it was also unfair to firefighters who did not score highly 
                                                            
60 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 635 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 637 (quoting Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1021–22 
(1st Cir. 1974)). 
63 Id. at 583. 
64 See Subotnik, supra note 2, at 401. 
65 See Ricci v. DiStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 630 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 637 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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on the existing test68 to administer and use for promotions a test that 
was significantly flawed as a measure of job qualification, especially 
in light of the availability of better and less discriminatory tests. 
Professor Subotnik argues not just that the City of New Haven 
made a judgment based on race but that, in doing so, it put the needs of 
the minority over the needs of the majority and failed to account for 
the costs of “ignoring job preparedness.”69 While it is certainly 
possible for a decision-maker to do that, Professor Subotnik paints 
with too broad a brush. Motivated by the desire to avoid unjustified 
disparate results, the decision-makers looked at what the City truly 
needed in qualified leaders for the fire department. They decided to 
ignore the results of what they determined was an inferior and 
incomplete process. The City of New Haven had an interest in having 
the most qualified fire officers leading its department and an interest in 
having tests that best identified those people. As Professors Harris and 
West-Faulcon note, “to the extent disparate impact law pushes 
employers to make actual merit-based employment decisions, all racial 
groups, individual applicants, and society as a whole benefit.”70 
III. STANDARDIZED TESTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
Ricci involved the appropriate response when standardized testing 
of firefighters seeking promotions resulted in significant differences in 
outcome with respect to race, but the story told and the issues raised 
and decided in that case have broad implications for all use of 
standardized testing that produces such gaps. While Ricci is the 
starting place, Professor Subotnik’s primary targets are those who 
challenge the use of standardized testing as the key determinant for 
entry into law school and the legal profession. Professor Subotnik 
suggests that questioning reliance on the LSAT and bar exam because 
of the tests’ disparate impact equates to denigrating knowledge and 
intelligence: “a rich irony is served up when legal academics pooh-
pooh the importance of learning and educational achievement in 
economic life.”71 He further suggests that if a decision-maker really 
                                                            
68 Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 52, at 127 (noting that white firefighters 
were also harmed by the exam). 
69 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 392–94. 
70 Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 52, at 121. 
71 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 395. Throughout his article, Professor Subotnik 
makes this “knowledge or diversity” point in numerous ways: e.g. jobs go to 
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wants to ensure inclusion of minorities, it can administer “simplified” 
questions or set a low threshold for qualification and then use a lottery 
for selection.72 That insulting argument73 rests on the false premise 
that the tests validly measure what it takes to succeed, so achieving 
diversity requires “moving the finish line”74 to designate the winners 
irrespective of merit. Professor Subotnik thereby suggests a false 
dichotomy in law as in fire-fighting: best qualified applicant or diverse 
outcome, but not both. As argued in the previous section, tests that 
produce disparate outcomes should be examined to ensure that they 
are, in fact, valid measures of job or academic performance and that 
there are no viable, less discriminatory alternatives. Professor Subotnik 
clearly believes that the LSAT and the bar exam are appropriate 
gateways to law school, to law licensing, and to law practice. In this 
section, we challenge that assumption and describe how to better 
protect the public interest by testing more comprehensively the skill 
set necessary to succeed in law. 
A. Questioning the Bar Exam 
In 2002, the Society of American Law Teachers (SALT) published 
a critique of the bar exam, suggesting that the exam poorly measures 
who has minimum competence to practice law.75 Just as unexpected 
disparate outcomes prompted the City of New Haven to examine its 
firefighting promotion tests to ensure they were the best predictors of 
                                                                                                                                            
people who are not best suited. Id. at 344; OCED study suggests that a society 
that belittles knowledge and learning can pay a high economic price. Id. at 346; 
race again, above all else. Id. at 370. 
72 Subotnik, supra note 2 at 347. 
73 It is not the suggestion of using a lottery for selection that is insulting. As 
Professor Subotnik notes, Susan Sturm and Lani Guinier have also suggested 
using a lottery for selection. However, their point is quite different and is based 
on the belief that the tests are not valid as selection tools and that the 
opportunities offered (of a job, a promotion, a place in an educational 
institution) should be distributed more randomly—and therefore equitably—
among “relatively indistinguishable candidates.” See Susan Sturm & Lani 
Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 
CAL. L. REV. 953, 1012 (1996). However, Professor Subotnik connects 
examination performance with quality so “lowering the threshold” means, to 
him, lowering the quality of those receiving the benefit or reward in the service 
of “race above all.” 
74 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 338. 
75 See SALT Statement on the Bar Exam, supra note 1. 
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job success, the bar exam’s disparate outcomes76 prompted SALT to 
encourage states to review their bar exams to determine whether those 
exams were the best predictive measure of future lawyers’ competence 
and whether viable and less discriminatory alternatives existed. Just as 
the City of New Haven sought fair measures that could demonstrate 
who would make the best lieutenants and captains, SALT sought, and 
continues to seek, fair outcomes that can demonstrate who will make 
successful and competent lawyers. 
Like those critiquing the New Haven firefighters’ exam as having 
an insufficient relationship to how firefighting leaders employ their 
skills at the stationhouse and in actual fires, SALT critiqued the bar 
exam based upon the disjunction between what the bar exam tests and 
how lawyers practice.77 Professor Subotnik and other defenders of the 
bar exam argue that even though the bar exam fails to test all the skills 
lawyers need, the skills it does test—reading comprehension, issue 
spotting, legal reasoning and analysis, and written communication78—
                                                            
76 LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LSAC NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL BAR PASS STUDY 27 
(1998), http://www.unc.edu/edp/pdf/NLBPS.pdf (reporting findings that first-
time bar pass rates were 92% for whites, compared to 61% for African 
Americans, 66% for Native Americans, 75% for Mexican Americans/Hispanics, 
and 81% for Asian American). 
77 See SALT Statement on the Bar Exam, supra note 1. 
78 According to the National Conference of Bar Examiners [NCBE], the multiple 
choice and essay question portion of the exam tests the ability to: 
(1) identify legal issues raised by a hypothetical factual situation; 
(2) separate material which is relevant from that which is not; (3) 
present a reasoned analysis of the relevant issues in a clear, 
concise, and well-organized composition; and (4) demonstrate an 
understanding of the fundamental legal principles relevant to the 
probable solution of the issues raised by the factual situation. The 
primary distinction between the MEE [Multistate Essay 
Examination] and the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE) is that 
the MEE requires the examinee to demonstrate an ability to 
communicate effectively in writing. 
Overview of the MEE, NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAMINERS, http://www
.ncbex.org/about-ncbe-exams/mee/overview-of-the-mee/ (last visited 
June 18, 2014). 
 The Multistate Performance Test is described as measuring the ability to: 
(1) sort detailed factual materials and separate relevant from 
irrelevant facts; (2) analyze statutory, case, and administrative 
materials for applicable principles of law; (3) apply the relevant 
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are so foundational that one cannot be an effective lawyer without 
minimum competence in those skills.79 Of course, lawyers must be 
able to read, spot issues, and engage effectively in legal analysis and 
written communication. But saying those skills are fundamental does 
not establish that the bar exam is the best way to assess baseline 
competence in light of how those skills are used by lawyers, or that it 
is appropriate to use a test of only those skills as a gateway to the 
profession. Nor does it address whether there are viable, and better, 
ways to test for lawyering skills, and without a disparate racial impact. 
Professor Subotnik focuses his attention on SALT’s critique of the 
bar exam, but similar concerns have been raised for years, not only by 
other commentators, but by the organized bar, which has repeatedly 
questioned the traditional bar exam because of the narrow range of 
skills it tests and the disparate racial impact it produces. The New 
York organized bar’s decades-long history of studying the bar exam is 
illustrative and worth describing at some length to underscore that 
                                                                                                                                            
law to the relevant facts in a manner likely to resolve a client’s 
problem; (4) identify and resolve ethical dilemmas, when present; 
(5) communicate effectively in writing; and (6) complete a 
lawyering task within time constraints.  
Overview of the MPT, NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAMINERS, http://www
.ncbex.org/about-ncbe-exams/mpt/overview-of-the-mpt/ (last visited 
June 18, 2014). 
79 See Subotnik, supra note 2, at 371; Suzanne Darrow-Kleinhaus, A Response to 
The Society of American Law Teachers Statement on the Bar Exam, 54 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 442, 442 (2004) (noting that the bar exam tests “reading comprehension 
and reasoning, identifying and formulating legal issues, organizing information, 
following directions and the ability to write”); Denise Riebe, A Bar Review for 
Law School: Getting Students on Board to Pass Their Bar Exams, 45 BRANDEIS 
L. J. 269, 279 (2006). Riebe argues that: 
[B]ar exams test many fundamental skills which should have been 
learned in law school and which are essential to the practice of 
law, including: reading critically, comprehending what is read, 
reasoning logically, analyzing factual scenarios, separating 
relevant from irrelevant information, mastering and understanding 
legal rules, performing under time constraints, meeting time 
deadlines, identifying legal issues, applying legal rules to clients’ 
situations, thinking like a lawyer, organizing information, 
following directions, and communicating effectively in writing.  
 Id. 
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challenges to the bar exam are not politically motivated, nor do they 
represent a “race above all” attitude. 
As far back as 1992, the Committee on Legal Education of the 
New York City Bar Association identified problematic aspects of the 
bar exam and expressed the view that “the NYS Bar Exam does not 
adequately or effectively test minimal competence to practice law in 
New York.”80 In its report, the committee recommended reducing the 
number of doctrinal areas tested, assessing more lawyering skills, 
eliminating all multiple choice questions (including the Multistate Bar 
Exam as well as multiple choice questions based on New York law), 
and eliminating the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam.81 
The Committee suggested substituting new performance-test questions 
for the multiple choice questions, integrating ethical issues into the 
essays or the performance test, and exploring the use of videotape 
examination questions for both skills and doctrinal questions.82 The 
report raised concerns about the disproportionate effect of the bar 
exam on minority applicants, which it found problematic on public 
policy grounds, especially in light of the report’s findings regarding 
the inadequacies of the exam.83 It recommended that data be collected 
to assess disparate impact and that all revisions to the bar exam be 
evaluated in light of whether they would exacerbate that problem. The 
goal, the committee said, should be to reduce the disproportionate 
impact while enforcing reasonable standards of attorney competence.84 
                                                            
80 ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., REPORT ON ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN 
NEW YORK IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 467 
(1992). 
81 See id at 470. 
82 Id. 
83 See id at 467. 
84 Id. at 468. The recommendations of the report resulted only in the addition of 
one performance question, while subsequent data collection in New York 
confirmed the persistence of the exam’s disparate racial impact; see MICHAEL 
KANE ET AL, NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAMINERS: IMPACT OF THE INCREASE IN THE 
PASSING SCORE ON THE NEW YORK BAR EXAM 6 (Oct. 4, 2006), http://www
.nybarexam.org/press/nyrep_feb06.pdf. 
[T]he differences in pass rates among the different racial/ethnic 
groups are quite large, with the Caucasian/White group having the 
highest pass rates (about 88% for a passing score of 660 and about 
85% for a passing score of 675), and the Black/African American 
group having the lowest passing rates (about 58% for a passing 
score of 660 and about 50% for a passing score of 675. 
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As a result of the 1992 report, the New York Court of Appeals 
commissioned a study of the bar exam by a team of psychometricians 
and testing professionals who were charged to consider, among other 
issues, bar exam content validity (the extent to which the test measures 
all aspects of lawyer competence),85 construct validity (the degree to 
which the test measures what it claims to be measuring),86 and race 
and gender performance.87 To help determine content validity, the 
Court of Appeals appointed panels of New York lawyers to consider 
three questions: what areas of law do experienced lawyers think should 
be tested and with what emphasis; what does the bar exam test besides 
knowledge of the law; and what other competencies should be tested.88 
Defining the skills necessary for competent practice as those whose 
absence would be apt to harm a client, the study identified the key 
skills89 and knowledge90 necessary for the competent practice of law. 
Given the breadth of those skills, the study concluded that the exam 
could be “advantageously expanded” because it is “far from a perfect 
sampling of all important lawyering skills.”91 
With respect to construct validity, the report concluded that the bar 
exam is both valid and reliable (that is, it consistently measures what it 
claims to be measuring—generalized legal knowledge and legal 
                                                                                                                                            
  Id. at 6. 
85 JASON MILLMAN ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR 
EXAMINATION 3-1 (May 1993) (defining content validity as the extent to which 
the test measures all aspects of lawyer competence). 
86 Id. at 9-1. 
87 Id. at 10-1. 
88 Id. at 3-1. 
89 Id. at 3-13. Legal analysis and reasoning; legal research; factual investigation 
and analysis; problem solving and case planning; written communication; 
personal qualities of integrity, diligence, timeliness and sound ethical awareness; 
interpersonal tasks including interviewing, negotiating and counseling; and oral 
communication and advocacy in the motion and appellate contexts. Id. 
90 Id. Knowledge of some core body of doctrinal and procedural law, knowledge of 
ethical mandates, and knowledge of basic concepts underlying the common law 
and constitutional law and statutory interpretation. Id. 
91 Id. at 3-15. The skills and knowledge identified by the study are detailed in the 
previous two footnotes. This work is consistent with the more recent work done 
by Marjorie Schultz and Sheldon Zedeck who catalogued the essential 
competencies by interviewing practicing lawyers and asking them to identify 
what characteristics they need and value most in their associates. Marjorie M. 
Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, supra note 1, at 620. 
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reasoning),92 but raised questions about the exam’s “speededness.”93 A 
“speeded” exam is one for which the results are dependent on the rate 
at which the work is performed as well as on the correctness of the 
response.94 Exams differ in their degree of speededness and the impact 
of speededness on various test-takers.95 The report cited evidence that 
the bar exam is a speeded exam and that doubling the time allowed for 
the MBE would likely produce a 30 point increase on the New York 
exam results.96 Notably, the report concluded that “speed in reading 
fact patterns, selecting answers, and writing essay responses [is] not 
the kind of speed needed to be a competent lawyer.”97 
The report also confirmed that there was a significant gap in 
passage rates based on race/ethnicity.98 While it found no evidence of 
                                                            
92 MILLMAN ET AL., supra note 85, at 9-17. 
93 See id. at 9-6. 
94 For a definition of “speeded,” see Kristin Booth Glen, Thinking Out of the Bar 
Exam Box: A Proposal to “MacCrate” Entry to the Profession, 23 PACE L. REV. 
3507 (2003) (“speeded,” i.e., requiring speed for success). 
95 See William D. Henderson, The LSAT, Law School Exams, and Meritocracy: 
The Surprising and Undertheorized Role of Test-Taking Speed, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
975, 991 fn 65 (2004) (noting that on the LSAT, speededness is currently 
measured by calculating the proportion of test takers who do not reach each item 
on the test). 
96 MILLMAN ET AL., supra note 85, at 9-8. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 10-4. For the July 1992 bar exam, the passing rate for Asian Americans 
was 53%; for African Americans 37.4%; for Hispanics 48.6%; and for Whites 
81.6%. This disparity is consistent with the findings of disparate impact reported 
nationally by the LSAC. See WIGHTMAN, supra note 76 at 27. Additionally, 
African American law graduates are five times more likely than white graduates 
to fail the bar examination on the first taking, and while the eventual pass rates 
were better, the disparity nevertheless persisted. Id. at 27 Table 6 (noting that 
38.6% of first time black bar examinees fail compared to 8.07% of whites). For 
instance, studies performed for New York by the National Conference of Bar 
Examiners show that the differential in performance by different ethnic groups 
has persisted even though the breadth of the difference has decreased over time. 
See FORDHAM URBAN LAW J., REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL 
COMMISSION ON MINORITIES 268 (1991) available at http://ir.lawnet
.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1359&context=ulj (noting that from 
1985–1988, black bar examinees had a first time pass rate of 31% compared to a 
73.1% rate for whites). The black/white differential is still 72.3% vs. 92.1%. The 
racial disparity in pass rates was further confirmed in 2006. See KANE, supra 
note 84, at 88. 
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facial racial bias, the report acknowledged that more subtle bias might 
play a role.99 
Since 1993, the New York bar has conducted several additional 
inquiries and repeatedly raised similar concerns. In 1996, the 
Professional Education Project, in a study commissioned by Court of 
Appeals Chief Judge Judith Kaye, recommended reducing the number 
of subjects tested and developing alternative testing techniques to 
permit assessment of a wider range of skills.100 In 2002, the 
Committees of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the State 
Bar Association and the Bar of the City of New York issued a joint 
report criticizing the bar exam for testing only a few of the core 
competencies required to practice law and citing the national 
longitudinal study that showed a significant and serious disparate 
racial impact.101 In 2005, the President of the New York State Bar 
Association (NYSBA) created the “Special Committee to Study the 
Bar Exam and other Means of Measuring Lawyer Competence.” After 
five years of study and debate, the Committee produced the Kenney 
Report in 2010. The Report recommended streamlining the exam to 
test more realistically for the knowledge of critical legal rules that 
should be memorized, reducing the amount of rote memorization, and 
testing other skills. In 2012, the New York State Bar Association 
Committee on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar responded 
to a call by the NYSBA President to review the Kenney Report and 
issued a report recommending several proposals to link licensing to 
more of the skills required in the profession.102 
                                                            
99 See MILLMAN ET AL., supra note 85, at 10-15. 
100 PROF’L EDUC. PROJECT, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
IN NEW YORK STATE (1996). 
101 See COMMS. ON LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF THE ASS’N OF THE 
BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & THE N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, PUBLIC SERVICE 
ALTERNATIVE BAR EXAM (June 14, 2002), available at http://www.nysba
.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=26667 
102 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N COMM. ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE 
BAR, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REPORT OF THE 
SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE BAR EXAMINATION AND OTHER MEANS OF 
MEASURING LAWYER COMPETENCE (Feb. 12, 2013). The Report recommended 
streamlining the exam and assisting the Board of Law Examiners in determining 
essential content, creating a Practice Readiness Evaluation Program (PREP) that 
would award points on the bar exam for successful completion of a duly 
certified clinical course in law school, creation of a pilot project to test a Public 
Service Alternative to the Bar Exam, studying whether speededness is a 
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Most recently, in the fall of 2013, the New York City Bar 
Association issued a Task Force Report that addressed a range of 
critical issues facing the profession today.103 Among its findings, the 
Task Force reported that “innovation in new lawyer preparation and 
practice is inhibited by a number of structural impediments that must 
be removed, through [inter alia] reform of bar exams to permit greater 
mobility and to focus on the skills needed for success, rather than rote 
memorization of legal concepts.”104 The Report acknowledged that bar 
exams require students to “learn the breadth of the law” but noted: 
[B]ar exams are also subject to significant criticism. In particular, 
critics argue that they are antiquated and fail to test the relevant 
skills needed to be a lawyer in the twenty-first century. First, the 
exams ask questions that can easily be answered through legal 
research. Second, the exams test an applicant’s memory about 
information that will quickly be forgotten after the exam. Third, 
most lawyers specialize in their practices, rendering the majority of 
the information learned for a bar exam irrelevant. (Criminal 
lawyers have little use for the intricacies of state commercial paper 
law; corporate deal makers do not need to know state-specific civil 
procedure.) Finally, and perhaps most importantly in an age 
requiring graduates to be practice ready, bar exams test few 
lawyering skills.105 
In its Findings and Recommendations, the Report called on the New 
York Board of Law Examiners and the New York Court of Appeals to 
consider revising the content of the bar exam “to test both substantive 
law and legal practice skills such as complex problem-solving, project 
management, and exercising professional judgment. . . eliminate[ing] 
and replace[ing], at least in part, certain areas of the MBE and MPRE 
in favor of more innovative practice-oriented testing,” and moving 
                                                                                                                                            
necessary lawyering skill and assessing whether it is producing disparate 
impacts on women and minorities, and studying the New Hampshire Daniel 
Webster Program, a two year performance-based bar exam that takes place 
within law schools, to see whether it could be replicated in New York. The 
alternatives noted here are discussed in this Article infra at notes 159–176. 
103 NEW YORK CITY BAR, DEVELOPING LEGAL CAREERS AND DELIVERING JUSTICE 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY, NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON NEW 
LAWYERS IN A CHANGING PROFESSION (Fall 2013). 
104 Id. at 5. 
105 Id. at 78. 
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away from “the bar examination’s focus on rote memorization [which] 
does not benefit any identifiable constituency.”106 
As illustrated in the more than 20 years of review and criticism by 
the organized bar of New York, concerns about using the bar exam as 
an all-or-nothing gateway to the legal profession are not new, and are 
not confined to the members of the Society of American Law Teachers 
and a small group of academics. Nor do the critiques emanate from a 
“race above all” ideology. The New York State organized bar’s 
repeated calls for reform reveal that SALT’s critique of the bar exam is 
shared by practicing lawyers who understand the importance of 
ensuring that licensing truly acts as an accurate measure of 
competence to practice law. What is perhaps most remarkable about 
the history described here is the marginal difference the New York bar 
calls for reform have made in the bar exam itself. The most significant 
change resulting from the many reports, task forces, and 
recommendations was the addition of one Multistate Performance Test 
question to the New York bar exam. While responding to one aspect of 
the critiques, that addition does little to address the broad range of 
criticism leveled at the bar exam, leaving it still an inadequate measure 
of lawyering competence and a racially disparate gateway exam that 
still cannot be justified. In the sections below, we explore the evidence 
that leads us, and prominent members of the New York bar, to reach 
that conclusion. 
B. What’s Wrong with the Bar Exam? 
Even granting that the bar exam tests only a subset of the skills 
necessary for law practice, are those skills so fundamental, and does 
the bar test those skills sufficiently well, to warrant using it as a 
threshold exam? If applicants cannot pass the bar exam, is it worth 
testing any other skills they might have? Professor Subotnik asks: “If a 
job requires two skill sets, say jumping and skipping, and if only 
jumping can be successfully tested, does equity really require that the 
measurable skill be left untested?”107 The analogy is incomplete, 
however. One has to ask whether the test accurately tests jumping, and 
if jumping—as defined in and tested by the exam—is the same skill of 
jumping required in the job. It is both what and how you test that 
matters. While the skills the bar exam purports to test—reading, issue 
                                                            
106 Id. at 85. 
107 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 343. 
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spotting, legal analysis and writing—are clearly fundamental 
lawyering skills, it is not self-evident that the manner in which these 
skills are tested indicates whether bar applicants possess these 
requisite lawyering skills and can apply them in the manner lawyers 
use them. Contrary to Professor Subotnik’s argument, neither SALT, 
nor we, argue that states should license incompetent lawyers; the 
question is whether the bar exam, as presently constituted, is the 
appropriate “gateway to the profession” test. 
1. Bar Exam Format 
The bar exam is a timed test, created or adopted by each state’s bar 
examiners, and generally consists of a multiple choice section, essay 
questions, and one or two “performance” questions.108 In most states, 
the bar exam lasts two days and tests knowledge of majority and 
minority jurisdiction legal rules, and exceptions to those rules, from 
material covered in eighteen or more one- or two-semester doctrinal 
law courses. All jurisdictions except Louisiana and Puerto Rico 
administer the multiple choice section of the bar exam (the “Multi-
State Bar Exam”) written by the National Conference of Bar 
Examiners (NCBE) and containing 200 multiple choice questions 
covering seven doctrinal areas.109 The NCBE also offers essay 
questions that test majority and minority rules; a state may grade the 
responses based on its own law or may write and use its own state-
focused essay questions.110 Whichever method is used, the essay 
portion of the exam generally has questions drawn from about eighteen 
                                                            
108 See About NCBE Exams, NCBEX.ORG, http://www.ncbex.org/about-ncbe-exams/ 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2014) (describing the various components of the bar 
exam). Currently, over 35 states include at least one multi-state “performance” 
question on their exam. See MPT FAQs, NCBEX.ORG, http://www.ncbex
.org/about-ncbe-exams/mpt/mpt-faqs/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2014). States also 
determine the state’s passing score and the weight given to each section of their 
bar exam. See Gary S. Rosin, Unpacking the Bar: Of Cut Scores and 
Competence, 32 J. LEGAL PROF., 67, 68 (2008) (discussing various states’ 
passing scores and grading methods). 
109 About NCBE Exams, NCBEX.ORG, http://www.ncbex.org/about-ncbe-exams
/mbe/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2014). The current MPT portion of the bar exam 
tests: constitutional law, contracts, criminal law, criminal procedure, evidence, 
real property and torts. In 2015, it will add questions on civil procedure. 
Multistate Bar Examination News, NCBEX.ORG, http://www.ncbex.org/home
/multistate-bar-examination-news/ (Sep., 2013). 
110 See NCBE, A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 
(2014) (describing the components of each state’s bar exam). 
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doctrinal subject areas.111 The third section of the test, the performance 
test, requires examinees to review a packet of factual and legal 
information and draft a legal document in 90 minutes.112 As of January 
1, 2014, fourteen states had adopted the Uniform Bar Exam [UBE], 
which tests majority/minority rules using multiple choice, essay and 
“performance” questions.113 
2. Focus on Memorization 
With the exception of the Multi-State Performance Test questions, 
the bar exam is a closed book test. The volume of material from which 
test questions are drawn covers thousands of pages in bar preparation 
materials. Professor Subotnik argues that passing the bar exam is a 
measure of bar applicants’ ability to learn the law114 and that the 
volume of material to be memorized is laudable because it indicates 
command of foundational rules.115 To support his premise that those 
who question the bar exam denigrate learning, Professor Subotnik 
argues that memorization is useful because the opposite of 
memorization is ignorance.116 This follows Professor Subotnik’s 
pattern of relying on logical fallacies, in this case equating 
                                                            
111 Overview of the MEE, NCBEX.ORG, http://www.ncbex.org/about-ncbe-exams/
mee/overview-of-the-mee/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2014). The exact number of 
subjects tested varies state by state. In addition to the areas tested by the MBE, 
the multi-state essay exam tests business associations (agency and partnership; 
corporations and limited liability companies), conflict of laws, constitutional 
law, contracts, criminal law and procedure, evidence, family law, federal civil 
procedure, real property, torts, trusts and estates (decedents’ estates; trusts and 
future interests), and uniform commercial code (negotiable instruments and bank 
deposits and collections; secured transactions). Some questions may include 
issues in more than one area of law. 
112 Id. 
113 The Uniform Bar Examination, NCBEX.ORG, http://www.ncbex.org/about-ncbe-
exams/ube/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2014) (listing of states that adopted the UBE, 
including a description of the UBE’s content and how it is graded). States 
determine their own passing scores. Id. New York’s Chief Judge recently 
proposed adopting the UBE effective July 2015. See Joel Stashenko, Court 
Seeks Comment on Adopting Uniform Bar Exam, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 7, 2014, at 1 
available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202672451929/Court-
System-Seeks-Comment-on-Adopting-Uniform-BarExam?slreturn=201409201
20020 .  
114 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 369. 
115 Id. at 371. 
116 Id. at 371–72. 
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memorization of the law with knowledge of the law, and failure to 
memorize the law with ignorance of the law. 
Memorization does not equate to retained legal knowledge. Nor is 
it necessary to memorize a vast body of specific rules in order to 
capably practice law. In fact, to the extent one’s working memory is 
bombarded with too much information, there is a cognitive overload 
that can result in forgetting information crucial to understanding, and 
thus less overall learning.117 While memorizing the law is not enough 
to pass the bar exam,118 test-takers must be able to retrieve from 
memory the relevant legal rule or exception. This is unlike accessing 
the law in legal practice, in which lawyers, after they have identified 
the legal issue, usually must—and should—research the issue to 
determine the answer. Being a good lawyer is not about knowing 
answers immediately. Rather, good lawyers know enough to ask the 
right questions, figure out how to approach the problem and research 
the law, or know enough to recognize that the question is outside of 
their expertise and should be referred to a lawyer more well-versed in 
that area of the law.119 While lawyers must have a baseline knowledge 
                                                            
117 Hillary Burgess, Deepening the Disclosure Using the Legal Mind’s Eye: 
Lessons from Neuroscience and Psychology that Optimize Law School Learning, 
29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 40–41 (2011) (discussing the application of cognitive 
load theory to law student learning). 
118 Darrow-Kleinhaus, supra note 79, at 442. 
119 See Karen Erger, Moving Towards Malpractice, 23 GPSOLO TECHNOLOGY & 
PRACTICE GUIDE June 2006, available at https://www.americanbar.org
/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_magazine_index/200
6_jun_malpractice.html. 
Being a lawyer ATM, dispensing legal advice at a moment’s 
notice, any time, day or night, is a malpractice trap. . . . It is all too 
easy to shoot from the hip and end up shooting yourself in the 
foot. . . . Inevitably, you’ll end up making mistakes. There is no 
shame in saying, ‘I need to do some research—can I call you later 
this afternoon, when I’m back in the office?’ Good clients—the 
type you want to have and keep—will appreciate that you are 
taking their matters seriously enough to get things right. 
 Id.; see also, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.1 (2013) (setting forth a lawyer’s duty of competent representation which 
requires “the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably 
necessary for the representation”). 
A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior 
experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the 
lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as 
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of legal rules sufficient to be able to issue-spot, they need not 
memorize, or be able to memorize, the nuances tested by the bar exam 
in order to represent clients competently. Testing whether a bar 
applicant can memorize hundreds of factoids about multiple areas of 
law does not test a relevant skill. And as many lawyers will attest, they 
quickly forgot the law they memorized for the bar exam.120 Whether 
the bar exam is the best way to ensure applicants have the necessary 
baseline understanding of legal doctrine is not established. 
When one claims, as does Professor Subotnik, that the bar exam is 
a measure of ability to learn,121 the question must be: to learn what? 
One might conclude that the bar exam best tests the ability to learn 
how to take the bar exam itself. Literature suggests that taking bar 
preparation courses and practice tests or academic enrichment courses 
geared toward bar passage can improve bar pass rates.122 Whether 
those who improve their results on the test are more competent to 
practice law is much less clear. 
                                                                                                                                            
competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important 
legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of 
evidence and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. 
Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining 
what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that 
necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A 
lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field 
through necessary study. Competent representation can also be 
provided through the association of a lawyer of established 
competence in the field in question.  
Id. at 1.1. cmt. 2. 
120 See Burgess, supra note 117, at 40. 
121 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 369. 
122 See Linda Jellum & Emmeline Paulette Reeves, Cool Data on a Hot Issue: 
Empirical Evidence that a Law School Bar Support Program Enhances Bar 
Performance, 5 NEV. L. J. 646 (2005); Derek Alphran, Tanya Washington, & 
Vincent Eagan, Yes We Can, Pass the Bar. University of the District of 
Columbia, David A. Clarke School of Law Bar Passage Initiatives and Bar Pass 
Rates – From the Titanic to the Queen Mary!, 14 U.D.C. L. REV. 9 (2011); see 
also, Keith A. Kaufman, V. Holland LaSalle-Ricci, Carol R. Glass, & Diane B. 
Arnkoff , Passing the Bar Exam: Psychological, Educational, and Demographic 
Predictors of Success, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 205, 218 (2007) (finding that “on 
average, graduates who passed the bar exam on their first try took almost twice 
as many practice tests as did those who failed” but also finding that the number 
of practice tests did not affect second-time performance after an initial failure). 
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3. Impact of Test-Taking Speed  
The bar exam, like other standardized tests, measures a variable 
unrelated to law practice: test-taking speed.123 The multi-state multiple 
choice exam requires test-takers to complete 100 questions in 180 
minutes in the morning and again in the afternoon, so they can spend 
only an average 1.8 minutes on each question. Multi-state essay 
questions allocate approximately a half hour to answer each of six 
essay questions, many of which may be multi-part questions.124 The 
multi-state performance test, a test designed to assess test takers’ 
ability to read and interpret the law in light of a client’s problem and to 
produce a product similar to those produced by lawyers125—and thus 
the part of the test most aligned with the actual work of attorneys—
allows test takers 90 minutes to read the provided cases, statutes, and 
other materials and then prepare a legal document.126 All portions of 
the bar exam thus require examinees to act quickly as they read and 
digest the material, recall the applicable law, and apply that law to the 
given test question. 
                                                            
123 Henderson supra note 95, at 979. 
124 Overview of the MEE, NCBEX.ORG, http://www.ncbex.org/about-ncbe-exams/
mee/overview-of-the-mee/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2014). (The multi-state essay 
exam consists of six thirty minute questions). States using the UBE must use the 
multi-state essay questions. Other states may use the questions. For a listing of 
which states use the MEE, see MEE FAQs, NCBEX.ORG, http://www.ncbex
.org/about-ncbe-exams/mee/mee-faqs/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2014). 
125 Overview of the MPT, NCBEX.ORG, http://www.ncbex.org/about-ncbe-exams
/mpt/overview-of-the-mpt/. The NCBE says that the multi-state performance test 
measures the ability to: 
(1) sort detailed factual materials and separate relevant from 
irrelevant facts; (2) analyze statutory, case, and administrative 
materials for applicable principles of law; (3) apply the relevant 
law to the relevant facts in a manner likely to resolve a client’s 
problem; (4) identify and resolve ethical dilemmas, when present; 
(5) communicate effectively in writing; and (6) complete a 
lawyering task within time constraints.  
Id. 
126 Id. The NCBE provides two 90-minute questions for each administration of the 
MPT; states may choose to use one or both of them, but states administering the 
Uniform Bar Exam must use both. See id. (stating jurisdictions that use the UBE 
must administer two MPT questions and noting that jurisdictions, other than 
those using the UBE, may choose to use one or both of the MPT questions). 
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To illustrate the impact of speededness on bar exam performance, 
we include a closer look at an example of a bar exam question, offered 
by Professor Suzanne Darrow-Kleinhaus as an illustration that more 
than memorization is required to succeed on the bar exam:127 
Peavey was walking peacefully along a public street when he 
encountered Dorwin, whom he had never seen before. Without 
provocation or warning, Dorwin picked up a rock and struck 
Peavey with it. It was later established that Dorwin was mentally 
ill and suffered recurrent hallucinations. 
If Peavey asserts a claim against Dorwin based on battery, which 
of the following, if supported by evidence, will be Dorwin’s best 
defense? 
A) Dorwin did not understand that his act was wrongful. 
B) Dorwin did not desire to cause harm to Peavey. 
C) Dorwin did not know that he was striking a person. 
D) Dorwin thought Peavey was about to attack him.128 
Professor Darrow-Kleinhaus notes that test-takers who answer A 
or B may have “react[ed] to [the] answer instead of applying the 
elements methodically to the issue.”129 Test-takers should recognize, 
she says, that the intent element of battery is satisfied either when a 
harmful or offensive contact is intended or when the tortfeasor acts 
with purpose or with knowledge to a “substantial certainty” that the 
result will follow.130 But that oversimplifies the analytical process. To 
“methodically” apply the elements, test-takers should engage in the 
following sequence of thoughts:131 
 
• The elements of battery are (a) intent to cause a harmful or 
offensive contact and (b) a harmful or offensive bodily contact 
results. 
                                                            
127 Darrow-Kleinhaus, supra note 79, at 447–49. As noted earlier, retrieving 
relevant rules from one’s memory is the necessary first step to successfully 
answering this question, and we have challenged the value of that requirement. 
See supra text accompanying notes 117–120. Our point here is that speededness 
is also a problem because the test requires retrieval of memorized legal rules and 
then a substantial amount of analysis. 
128 Darrow-Kleinhaus, supra note 79, at 447–48. 
129 Id. at 448. 
130 Id. 
131 See Id. 
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• The definition of intent is (a) having the purpose or desire to 
cause a harmful or offensive bodily contact or (b) knowing with 
substantial certainty that such a result will occur. 
• How do those elements apply to answer A? If Dorwin didn’t 
understand his act was wrongful, he still may have had the 
requisite intent. Perhaps he thought that Peavey was Satan and he 
was saving the world. He would not have thought his action was 
wrongful but he would nevertheless satisfy the definition by 
having the purpose of causing a harmful or offensive bodily 
contact or knowing with substantial certainly that such a contact 
would occur. Answer A is incorrect. 
• How do those elements apply to answer B? If he knew that the 
harm was substantially certain to occur, then even if Dorwin didn’t 
want to cause harm, he would still be liable, so answer B is 
incorrect. 
• Considering answer C, does battery require that you know you 
are harming a person? If Dorwin did not know he was hitting a 
person, he probably would not be intending to harm a person or be 
substantially certain he was harming a person. Thus, C may be 
correct because if Dorwin did not know Peavey was a person he 
could not have formed the intent to commit a battery, which is only 
a tort against a person. Or, as Professor Darrow-Kleinhaus notes, 
“only. . .C completely negates the intent element: If Dorwin had no 
idea (no ‘knowledge’) he was striking a person, then he could not 
have formed the requisite intent to do the act.”132 
• Before choosing answer C, the test taker would also have to 
eliminate answer D. Although self-defense would be a viable 
defense “if supported by evidence,” Professor Darrow-Kleinhaus 
notes that the test-taker should realize answer D is incorrect 
because the facts do not indicate that Peavey was about to attack 
Dorwin and that the facts rule out this defense because “Peavey 
was walking peacefully” and it was “without provocation or 
warning [that] Dorwin picked up a rock.” 133 Thus, before 
eliminating answer D, the test-taker would likely need to return to 
the question and re-read the facts to know whether the answer 
could be correct. The test-taker would also have to know that self-
defense requires not only an actual but a reasonable belief in 
imminent harm, and that Dorwin might have thought he was in 
such a position as a result of his mental illness but his belief would 
not be reasonable. 
 
                                                            
132 Id. at 448. 
133 Id. 
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Professor Darrow-Kleinhaus uses this example to illustrate that 
“merely memorizing the elements of battery is insufficient because the 
bar exam requires an analysis of the question followed by an analysis 
of each possible answer with respect to the legal issue posed above.”134 
We suggest that the question and resulting analytical process illustrates 
the role test-taking speed plays in this gateway exam. Reading the 
question closely and engaging in the analytical process described 
above must happen in approximately one minute and 48 seconds. This 
same process must be undertaken 200 times for questions drawn from 
seven doctrinal areas. 
That the bar exam is time-pressured cannot be denied. But is the 
ability to successfully take such a timed exam important to 
establishing competence as a lawyer? Professor Subotnik argues it is 
because lawyers often must meet deadlines. He suggests, without any 
empirical basis, that test-taking speed is related to lawyer efficiency.135 
While it is true that lawyers must efficiently organize their time, the 
bar exam does not purport to test one’s ability to do that and there is 
no evidence that test-taking speed is related to lawyering skill. In fact, 
at least one study shows that “time management ability and its 
components . . . failed to predict bar exam passage.” 136 As noted by 
Professor William Henderson in his study of the role of speededness 
on the LSAT and in law school exams: 
Time is certainly relevant in the legal profession. Lawyers bill by 
the hour. They are also occasionally pressed by clients to provide 
immediate legal advice over the phone without the benefit of any 
research or reflection. An objection to an evidentiary issue cannot 
be the subject of an appeal unless it has been timely raised before 
the trial court. Similarly, appellate judges pride themselves on 
raising novel and unexpected issues during oral argument. 137 
But as Professor Henderson further notes, the need for efficiency 
in some (but not all) aspects of effective lawyering does not answer 
“[t]he more difficult analytical question” whether the time facility 
required on the LSAT or law school exams (or, we add, the bar exam) 
is “an accurate metric for these widely divergent concepts of efficiency 
                                                            
134 Id. at 449. 
135 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 372. 
136 Kaufman et al., supra note 122, at 217. 
137 Henderson, supra note 95, at 1035 (footnotes omitted). 
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and speed.”138 Based on his study of student performance on the LSAT 
and on in-class and much longer take-home exams, Professor 
Henderson concluded that time-pressured law school exams are not an 
effective measure of efficient writing ability or high performance in 
oral advocacy.139 The same may be said for time-pressured bar exams. 
As noted earlier, a New York bar study concluded that doubling the 
time allowed for the MBE would likely produce a thirty point increase 
on the New York exam results140 and that “speed in reading fact 
patterns, selecting answers, and writing essay responses is not the kind 
of speed needed to be a competent lawyer.”141 
4. Bar Exam Results and Law School Grading 
Professor Subotnik suggests that the correlation between law 
school grade point average [LGPA] and bar pass rate shows the bar 
exam is a measure of ability to learn and apply the law.142 A 
correlation between LGPA and bar pass rates is not surprising because 
many law school exams, especially in the first year, test students on 
the same skills as the bar exam and in similar ways—with multiple-
choice and essay questions relying on “speededness”—so the 
limitations of the bar exam as an accurate and comprehensive test of 
lawyer competence hold as well for those correlated exams. Neither 
indicates the ability to succeed in law practice, as further explored 
below. The question should not be whether LGPA relates to bar pass 
scores but rather whether the assessment methodologies used by both 
legal educators and bar examiners adequately capture the skills 
lawyers need as those skills are utilized in practice. As law schools 
expand the use of experiential coursework and non-speeded 
evaluation, the correlation between the two sets of exams may 
decrease. However, the current correlation is not by itself a reason to 
give more credence to the bar results. 
5. Bar Exam Results and Lawyering Competence 
Even if the bar exam (and law school exams) adequately test the 
admittedly important skill of learning legal rules and applying them to 
                                                            
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 1036–38. 
140 MILLMAN ET AL., supra note 85, at 9–8 & n. 11. 
141 Id. 
142 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 379–80. 
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new facts, it is far from clear that such exams test the ability to learn 
and apply the law in the context of client representation. As Professor 
Cecil Hunt notes, “while the bar examination may be an excellent test 
of the ability to study law competently, it does not necessarily indicate 
the ability to practice law competently.”143 Although we know of no 
large-scale study correlating bar exam scores or law school grades 
with professional success,144 a large New York law firm evaluated all 
the lawyers it hired over a thirty-year period and concluded that, with 
the exception of the top one to two percent of top law school 
performers, “there was little to no correlation between law school 
grades and the work performance of those who attained 
partnership.”145 
It would not be surprising to conclude that there is little correlation 
between law school grades and lawyers’ success, because many law 
school assessments do not measure the wide range of skills lawyers 
need, including creativity, the ability to work well in teams, listening 
skills, and common sense and good judgment.146 One multi-year study 
found no correlation between law school grades and achievement in a 
simulation-based negotiations class, in which the final grade was based 
upon bargaining results from a series of negotiation exercises and 
student papers analyzing their negotiation-exercise experiences.147 
Examining student grades over thirteen semesters in a class that ranged 
                                                            
143 Cecil J. Hunt, II, Guests in Another’s House: An Analysis of Racially Disparate 
Bar Performance, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 767 (1996). 
144 Lani Guinier, Lessons and Challenges of Becoming Gentlemen, 24 N.Y.U. Rev. 
L. & Soc. Change 1, 12 (1998) [hereinafter Guinier, Lessons and Challenges]; 
see also, David B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage, A 
Response to Sander, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1915, 1925 (2005) (“studies that attempt to 
understand the causes of long-term career success have not documented a robust 
correlation between grades and other entry-level credentials and long-term 
career success”). 
145 Guinier, Lessons and Challenges, supra note 144 at 12; see William C. Kidder, 
The Bar Examination and The Dream Deferred: A Critical Analysis of the MBE, 
Social Closure, and Racial and Ethnic Stratification, 29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 547, 
580 (2004) (discussing FTC study which found no correlation between the 
agency’s lawyers’ accomplishments and their bar exam performance or LSAT 
scores or LGPA) [hereinafter Kidder, The Bar Exam]. 
146 See, e.g., Shultz & Zedeck, supra note 1, at 630, Table 1 (listing lawyering 
effectiveness factors). 
147 Charles Craver, The Impact of Student GPAs And A Pass/Fail Option On 
Clinical Negotiation Course Performance, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DIS. RES. 373 
(2000). 
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from 40 to 62 students per semester, the instructor found that student 
grades on the exercises did not correlate with the students’ overall 
LGPAs. He suggests that this lack of correlation stems from the fact 
that traditional law school courses test abstract reasoning skills while 
the negotiation exercises measure emotional intelligence skills (e.g., 
the ability “to ‘read’ other people”).148 The course papers also did not 
assess traditional legal analysis; instead, they required students to 
engage in self-reflection about their bargaining interactions and how 
those interactions related to negotiation theory. This study confirms 
the intuition that the various kinds of intelligence needed by successful 
lawyers are not distributed in the same proportion in law students, bar 
applicants, and lawyers, and that as schools begin to integrate more 
experiential learning into the curriculum and assess skills beyond those 
related to abstract reasoning, the correlation between LGPA and bar 
pass may decline. 
6. What the Bar Exam Does Not Test 
A set of recent empirical studies, one of them commissioned by the 
National Conference of Bar Examiners, explore the work performed 
by newly licensed lawyers and the skills necessary for effective 
lawyering; both studies indicate the bar exam tests only a small portion 
of the skills new lawyers need.149 In its comprehensive study of the 
work performed by newly licensed lawyers, the NCBE sought to 
identify the tasks, knowledge domains, skills, and abilities significant 
to newly licensed lawyers to “provide a job related and valid basis for 
the development of licensing examinations offered by the NCBE.”150 
The study identified 329 tasks performed by a wide range of newly 
licensed lawyers with various specialties including: 43 “general tasks,” 
86 “knowledge domains,” and 36 general “skills and abilities.” 151 The 
                                                            
148 Id. at 383. 
149 See Shultz & Zedeck, supra note 1, at 623 (discussing the empirically derived 
list of lawyering effectiveness factors); Steven Nettles & James Hellrung, A 
Study of the Newly Licensed Lawyer, available at http://www.ncbex.org/assets
/media_files/Research/AMP-Final-2012-NCBE-Newly-Licensed-Lawyer-JAR
.pdf [hereinafter NCBE study] (setting out the numerous skills new lawyers need 
in order to perform their jobs). 
150 NCBE study, supra note 149, at 1. 
151 Id. at 289–98. Those tasks include aspects of managing the attorney-client 
relationship and caseload, communicating with clients and others, handling 
research and investigation, and analyzing and resolving client matters. The skills 
and abilities fell into similar categories. Id. 
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list reveals a multitude of lawyering tasks and skills the existing bar 
exam does not attempt to measure. 
The failure of the bar exam to test most of the skills necessary for 
practicing attorneys undermines the rationale for according it gateway 
status to the profession and adds to the justification for exploring 
additional and alternative means to test applicants’ entry-level 
competence. While Professor Subotnik suggests that critiques of the 
bar exam equate to anti-intellectualism,152 we suggest the opposite: the 
anti-intellectuals are those who rigidly insist the current exam is the 
best we can do and are unwilling to explore alternatives to what even 
its advocates admit is an imperfect exam. 
C. The Bar Exam Constrains Change in Legal Education 
Spurred by the economic downturn, by reports from the Carnegie 
Foundation153 and the Clinical Legal Education Association,154 and by 
criticism from the practicing bar and their own self-evaluations, law 
schools increasingly recognize that pure doctrinal teaching ill-equips 
students to represent clients.155 In response to these critiques, schools 
across the country are integrating experiential learning into their 
curricula and are expanding students’ experiential learning 
opportunities.156 Instructors in many, if not all doctrinal areas, have 
begun integrating more experiential exercises into doctrinal courses.157 
                                                            
152 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 369–70 (arguing that SALT does not care if future 
lawyers are learned in the law); id. at 398 (suggesting that those who critique 
tests actually critique knowledge and “devalue intellectual achievement”). 
153 WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007). 
154 Roy Stuckey et al., Best Practices for Legal Education: A Vision and a 
Roadmap, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. ASS’N. (2007), available at http://www
.cleaweb.org[Resources/Documents/best-practices-full.pdf. 
155 A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1949, 2001-15 (2012) (discussing decades of critiques 
about legal education’s failure to adequately prepare law students for law 
practice). 
156 As of December 2013, over 30 law schools had appointed deans or directors of 
experiential learning. E-mail from Alli Gerkman, Dir., Educating Tomorrow’s 
Lawyers (January 14, 2014, 16:13 EST) (on file with author Andrea Curcio). 
Just a few years ago, no such position existed at most law schools. A web search 
in October 2014 revealed dozens of schools advertising their experiential 
programs. 
157 See, e.g., Bradley T. Borden, Using the Client-File Method to Teach 
Transactional Law, 17 CHAPMAN L. REV. 101 (2013); Paula Schaefer, Injecting 
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Students are strongly encouraged to explore clinics and externships 
and other experiential learning opportunities. A recently adopted ABA 
Accreditation Standard requires all law students to take at least six 
experiential learning credits158 and California’s State Bar Board of 
Trustees has approved a competency training proposal for new lawyers 
that includes, among other things, 15 units of practice-based, 
experiential course work or an equivalent apprenticeship during law 
school.159 
As schools consider such changes, they will face inevitable tension 
between offering experiential learning courses and bar-exam-focused 
courses. While one study indicates that taking “bar courses” has little 
discernible impact on bar pass rates,160 both law students and law 
schools make curricular choices based on the assumption that it 
does.161 Especially in economic downturns such as the current one, 
                                                                                                                                            
Law Student Drama Into the Classroom: Transforming an E-Discovery Class 
(or Any Law School Class) with a Complex, Student-Generated Simulation, 12 
NEV. L. J. 130 (2011); Roberto Corrada, A Simulation of Union Organizing in a 
Labor Law Class, 46 J. Leg. Educ. 445 (1996); Anne M. Tucker, LLCs by 
Design, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 525 (2014). 
158 Standard 303(a)(3), 2014-2015 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE 
FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, available at http://www.americanbar.org
/groups/legal_education/resources/standards.html. 
159 Amy Yarborough, Board Asks for Next Steps in Competency Training Plan, 
CAL. ST. B.J. (Nov. 2013) available at http://www.calbarjournal.com/November
2013/TopHeadlines/TH4.aspx. 
160 Douglas K. Rush & Hisako Matsuo, Does Law School Curriculum Affect Bar 
Examination Passage? An Empirical Analysis of Factors Related to Bar 
Examination Passage During the Years 2001 Through 2006 at a Midwestern 
Law School, 57 J. LEG. EDUC.. 224, 234–35 (2007) (discussing how upper level 
elective choices had no correlation to bar pass rates for most students at St. 
Louis University School of Law). 
161 See, e.g., Donald H. Zeigler et al., Curriculum Design and Bar Passage: New 
York Law School’s Experience, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 393 (2010) (discussing how 
changes to NYLS’s curriculum, including the requirement that students in the 
bottom quartile of the class take a wide array of courses tested on the bar exam, 
have improved NYLS’ bar passage rates). Other schools have required 
struggling students to take examination subject matter courses. Rush & Matsuo, 
supra note 160, at 227–28; see also ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND 
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW 
SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 278 (1992) (commonly 
known as “The MacCrate Report”) (noting that the bar exam influences law 
schools to develop curricula that overemphasize courses covered by the exam 
and that the exam influences law students to choose doctrinal courses in areas 
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where should schools spend limited resources? Does it make sense for 
schools to focus on teaching more doctrine tested via multiple choice 
and essay questions, or is it more beneficial to expose students to 
experiential learning opportunities in which doctrine is integrated into 
real world experiences? Should the bar exam be the “tail that wags the 
dog”? These questions require thoughtful debate—something not 
possible if one simply insists that questioning the existing exam 
equates to anti-intellectualism. 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE EXISTING BAR EXAM 
In the circumstances of Ricci, as in other instances raising 
disparate impact concerns, a key question is whether valid but less 
discriminatory exams exist. The discriminatory impact of the bar exam 
should lead us to investigate the possibility and viability of less 
discriminatory alternative methods of testing attorney competence. 
Instead of supporting the consideration and development of 
alternatives, Professor Subotnik suggests that we cannot measure skills 
beyond those measured by the existing bar exam.162 To counter that 
argument, this Article reviews several alternative measures currently 
used, proposed, or under development. 
Although these particular innovations may or may not be the 
solution to the problematic reliance on a limited exam that has racially 
disparate outcomes, the critical point is that alternatives are possible 
and, if there is general agreement that skills beyond those tested on the 
bar exam matter, there will be a concerted effort to develop ways to 
test those skills. If we decide that skills should or must be assessed in 
more job-related ways, educators and testing companies will develop 
better tests to assess more skills. This has already occurred in the 
medical licensing field under the pressure to ensure that new doctors 
                                                                                                                                            
tested by the exam); Byron D. Cooper, The Bar Exam and Law Schools, 80 
MICH. B.J. 72, 73 (2001) (noting that some Michigan law schools saw 
substantial increases in students enrolling in no-fault automobile insurance and 
worker’s compensation classes when those subjects were added to the Michigan 
bar exam; further noting that an informal survey of Michigan property law 
professors found the majority of professors took “the bar exam into 
consideration in deciding which sections of the required casebook should be 
covered in the course.”) 
162 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 369 (arguing the bar exam is a meaningful exam); id. 
at 373–78 (critiquing proposed alternatives to the exam). 
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have more than book-learning about medicine.163 As already noted, 
alternative assessments of firefighters through simulations of real-
world situations were available through assessment centers,164 though 
the Ricci court did not compel their use.165 Those alternative 
assessments had a much smaller disparate impact than the contested 
paper and pencil tests. If individuals developing firefighter exams can 
create viable alternatives with higher construct validity and less 
discriminatory impact,166 we believe that the same result can be 
achieved by those developing law licensing exams. The disparate 
impact of current tests is a reason to explore those alternatives—not to 
reach a particular racially-balanced result, as Professor Subotnik 
contends, but to reach a result that does a better job at measuring 
competence. 
A. The New Hampshire Model 
The Daniel Webster Scholars Honors Program (DWS), launched in 
2005 at Franklin Pierce Law School, now the University of New 
Hampshire School of Law, is designed to produce client-ready lawyers 
by providing a two year practice-based, client-oriented education in 
the second and third years of law school. The program educates 
students, but also operates as an alternative bar exam, as students who 
successfully complete the program are certified by the Board of Law 
Examiners and are admitted to the New Hampshire bar upon 
graduation.167 
The DWS was originally conceived by Chief Justice Linda 
Dalianis of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, whose many years on 
                                                            
163 Jayne W. Barnard & Mark Greenspan, Incremental Bar Admission: Lessons 
From the Medical Profession, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 340, 344–45 (2003). The 
same development has occurred in the field of general cognitive testing; the 
disparate impact of general intelligence tests like the SAT has led researchers to 
explore broader conceptions of intelligence and to create tests to assess them. 
See infra Parts V.C, VI.A (discussing tests that can be used to supplement 
cognitive-based testing for admissions and employment decisions).  
164 Ricci v. DiStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 559 (2009). 
165 Id. at 609 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (citing to better tests used by many 
departments). 
166 IOP Brief, supra note 45 at 11; Ricci, 557 U.S. at 558. 
167 See John Burwell Garvey, Making Law Students Client-Ready – The Daniel 
Webster Scholar Honors Program: A Performance-Based Variant of the Bar 
Exam, N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 46 (Sept. 2013). Students must also satisfy the character 
and fitness requirement and pass the MPRE. N.H. SUP. CT R. 42, Part XII(a). 
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the bench convinced her that too many graduates of ABA-accredited 
law schools lacked the skills and knowledge necessary to practice law 
effectively. To develop a licensing mechanism that more closely 
evaluates the knowledge, skills, and values required for effective 
lawyering, Justice Dalianis created a working group of bar examiners, 
judges, lawyers, and academics to develop an alternative licensing 
program—a better bar exam—that would incorporate the “MacCrate” 
skills168 and assess students on whether they were truly practice-ready. 
Her goal was “to make lawyers better.”169 The Committee persuaded 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court to amend its bar admission rule to 
authorize a performance-based variant of the bar exam that 
“[consisted] of rigorous, repeated and comprehensive evaluation of 
legal skills and abilities.”170 
Participants in the program must maintain a high grade point 
average and complete simulation courses specially designed for the 
DWS program, as well as meet all other law school requirements for 
graduation. All DWS students are required to engage in pro bono work 
after receiving training as advocates for victims of domestic violence. 
Students must also take six credits of externship and/or clinical courses 
and, as their capstone course, Advanced Problem Solving and Client 
Counseling, a course “[t]hat integrates and builds upon the skills 
students have already learned through the program. This course takes 
them to the next level, particularly emphasizing fact gathering 
(including witness interviewing), legal analysis, problem solving, and 
client counseling.”171 
Assessment is “an integral part of the DWS program” and students 
receive “nearly continuous feedback.”172 The courses and the rubrics 
used to evaluate performance track the fundamental lawyering skills 
identified in the MacCrate Report as well as the factors identified in 
the Schultz/Zedeck study of effective lawyering, discussed below.173 
                                                            
168 See Robert MacCrate, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, Building The 
Continuum of Legal Education and Professional Development, 10 CLINICAL. L. 
REV. 805, 831 (2004). 
169 Hon. Linda S. Dalianis & Sophie M. Sparrow, New Hampshire’s Performance-
Based Variant of the Bar Examination: The Daniel Webster Scholar Program, 
THE BAR EXAMINER, November 2005, at 23, 25. 
170 N.H. SUP. CT. R. 42 at Part XII(a)(1). 
171 Garvey, supra note 167 at 45. 
172 Id. at 46–47. 
173 Id. See infra notes 234–37 and accompanying text. 
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Students develop an extensive portfolio, including videos of the 
student conducting simulated interviews, negotiations, and 
components of trial practice. Evaluation and assessment are done by 
law school faculty and members of the New Hampshire Board of Law 
Examiners, who review the student portfolios each semester and meet 
personally with the students each year to evaluate their progress. 
Students are also assessed through the use of standardized clients, a 
program modeled after the standardized patient used in medical school 
assessment. The simulated clients are actors trained to assess a 
student’s skill using written standardized criteria.174 
The success of the DWS program is evident in the feedback from 
employers, who report that graduates of the DWS program are better 
prepared for practice and far more client-ready than non-
participants.175 The program’s success in meeting its goals is also 
evident from observations by Lloyd Bond, one of the lead authors of 
the Carnegie Report: 
We can only hope that other state Supreme Courts will seriously 
consider the Webster Scholar method as an alternative approach to 
training and licensure. When I studied the program in depth . . . I 
said it fused instruction, assessment, and practice in such an 
integrated way that the three became indistinguishable. The Daniel 
Webster Scholar Program exemplifies the sea change we had in 
mind.176 
William Sullivan, the lead author of the Carnegie Report and the 
Founding Director of Educating Tomorrow’s Lawyers, agrees. In 
writing about the need to link a practice-based curriculum to 
licensing,177 he notes the need to “move students more effectively 
across the arc of professional development from novice to competent 
beginning practitioner and . . . to assess the readiness of such 
                                                            
174 Id. at 48. 
175 Educating Tomorrow’s Lawyers recently conducted a rigorous assessment of the 
DWS program. The results, which are expected to be published in Fall 2014, 
will play a major role in efforts to enhance the certification function of the bar 
exam. 
176 Lloyd Bond, Consulting Scholar (retired), The Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching, Prepared remarks to the Conference on a 
Performance-Based Approach to Licensing Lawyers: The New Hampshire 
“Two-Year Bar Examination” (April 23, 2010) (cited in Garvey, supra note 167 
at 50). 
177 William M. Sullivan, Align Preparation and Assessment with Practice: A New 
Direction for the Bar Examination, 85 N.Y. ST. B. J. 41 (2013). 
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developing lawyers”178 and cites the DWS program as doing just 
that.179 
The New Hampshire Daniel Webster Scholars Program 
demonstrates that it is possible to measure skills beyond those 
measured by the existing bar exam and that a performance-based bar 
exam is a better measure of the competencies required for law practice. 
The fact that the program requires a substantial commitment of 
educational resources and therefore may not be adopted by most 
jurisdictions in its current form does not detract from the conclusion 
that it is possible to design courses and assessments that focus on more 
than the slim set of skills tested by the current bar exam. 
B. Modify the Existing Exam 
To address one of the criticisms leveled against the current bar 
exam—that it depends too much on memorization—the New York bar 
has suggested testing fewer doctrinal subjects.180 Proponents of the 
multiple choice section of the exam argue that a large enough sample 
of multiple choice questions from a representative range of content is 
needed to ensure content validity,181 but testing fewer doctrinal areas 
should provide sufficient scope to test the ability to issue spot and 
engage in legal analysis. And if legal analysis is the key, not simply 
memorizing the rules, perhaps consideration should be given to 
making the exam somewhat “open book” by providing a sourcebook 
for rules so applicants could focus on applying law rather than 
memorizing law. 
To address a second concern about the current bar exam—that it 
depends too much on speededness—the number of questions, 
especially multiple choice questions, could be reduced or the time 
extended to allow test-takers more time per question, leading to a more 
relevant measure of knowledge and analysis, rather than of the ability 
to respond quickly in test-taking circumstances. 
Perhaps, as Professor Subotnik acknowledges,182 the cornerstone 
of a modified bar exam could be a performance test. A well-designed 
                                                            
178 Id. 
179 See supra note 175 
180 See supra notes 80–81. 
181 Workshop on the Future of the Legal Course Book, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 292, 
305 (2008). 
182 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 375. 
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performance test is a better way of testing lawyering skills than 
multiple choice and essay questions, which require memorization of 
large quantities of doctrine. In its current incarnation, however, 
performance testing is still a highly speeded endeavor. Students must 
read and digest multiple fact-based documents, cases, and statutory 
provisions, and write a memo, brief, or client advisory letter, within a 
ninety minute time period.183 While the tasks replicate what lawyers 
do, the testing method could be modified to bear a closer relationship 
to law practice and avoid undue compression of testing time. 
Nonetheless, the MPT, as currently embodied in the MPT and a part of 
the UBE, is a step in the right direction, especially if more time were 
allowed to analyze materials and compose documents, and if more of 
the exam were devoted to performance questions. 
To the extent the bar exam is modified so that it truly becomes a 
test about analyzing and applying the law and not merely remembering 
it, and avoids having test-taking speed be an independent variable 
affecting exam scores, the exam could be a vastly better measure of 
who should be permitted to enter law practice. Changes such as these 
could be explored and implemented without a radical overhaul of the 
entire system of bar admission. 
C. Test More Skills 
If the goal of licensing is to ensure entry-level competence for 
legal practice, licensing decisions should be based on an applicant’s 
demonstration of competence in the necessary set of skills. If less time 
were taken testing rules in many subject areas, time would be available 
to test a wider range of skills such as legal research, interviewing, 
counseling, and negotiation. With the advent of computer-based 
testing, testing such skills becomes more plausible.184 Interviewing, 
counseling, and negotiation skills could be assessed by asking 
questions based upon video vignettes, or simulations could be 
developed to test a wide range of lawyering skills using a virtual 
dialog with a simulated client, opposing counsel, or judge, similar to 
                                                            
183 For summaries of the materials and tasks required by the MPT, see 2013 Multi-
state Performance Test Information Booklet at 7–11, available at 
http://www.ncbex.org/assets/media_files/Information-Booklets/MPTIB2013
.pdf. 
184 See Andrea A. Curcio, A Better Bar: Why and How the Existing Bar Exam 
Should Change, 81 NEB. L. REV. 363, 366, 394–96 (2002) (discussing use of 
computer simulations to assess a wider range of lawyering skills). 
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what is already done in medical licensing.185 The legal profession 
could develop a “standardized client” assessment based upon the 
medical licensing standardized patient model.186 
Another practical way to assess an applicant’s competence in 
relevant skills, at least in part, is to rely on student participation in 
supervised clinic or externship experiences. This idea was originally 
proposed over ten years ago by Robert MacCrate,187 who recognized 
the value that clinical learning adds to law students’ education, and 
that successful completion of such experiences demonstrates the 
development of students’ skills, abilities and attitudes that cannot be 
tested in the existing bar format.188 “[J]ust as the results of the multi-
state performance test are factored into an applicant’s total score,” he 
suggested, “credit should be given for successfully completed clinical 
experiences supervised and certified by the faculty of a duly accredited 
law school.”189 An additional benefit of offering such credit is to 
encourage students to take courses in law school best designed to help 
them become better lawyers. 
Consistent with MacCrate’s proposal, in 2012 the New York State 
Bar Association Committee on Legal Education and Admissions to the 
Bar endorsed what it called a “Practice Readiness Evaluation 
Program” that would add points to a traditional bar exam score for 
those students who successfully completed a bar-certified clinical 
education experience.190 While expressing some concerns,191 the 
                                                            
185 Barnard & Greenspan, supra note 163, at 344 (discussing the use of case-based 
simulations in medical licensing); see PRIMUM COMPUTER BASED SIMULATIONS 
(CSS) FOR LICENSING DOCTORS, http://www.jisc.ac.uk/media/documents
/projects/higherorderskills.pdf (last visited Aug. 10, 2014) (describing how case-
based simulations in medical licensing works with sample problems). 
186 The theoretical underpinnings of the standardized client were discussed 
approximately a decade ago. See, e.g., Barnard & Greenspan, supra note 163, at 
345; Lawrence M. Grosberg, Standardized Clients: A Possible Improvement for 
the Bar Exam, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 841, 841 (2004). Work using standardized 
clients began with law students. See Karen Barton et al., Valuing What Clients 
Think: Standardized Clients and the Assessment of Communicative Competence, 
13 CLIN. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2006). The New Hampshire two year bar examination 
has incorporated standardized client assessments. Garvey, supra note 167, at 49. 
187 See MacCrate, supra note 168, at 831. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 New York State Bar Association Committee on Legal Education and Admission 
to the Bar, Recommendations for Implementation of the Report of the Committee 
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majority of the committee voted to explore the idea, believing that 
credit for a clinical experience “was a practical and affordable way” to 
integrate into the bar exam process assessment of student ability to 
handle real cases and real clients.192 
Earlier, in 2002, a Joint Report of the Committees on Legal 
Education and Admission to the Bar of the City of New York and the 
New York State Bar Association endorsed a Public Service Alternative 
to the Bar Exam (PSABE), a performance-based bar exam originally 
conceived by Kristin Booth Glen, then dean of CUNY Law School.193 
The PSABE is intended to test the skills identified by the MacCrate 
Report as necessary for the practice of law by placing students in a 
practice and public-service-based setting for three months. Dean Glen 
suggested that the court system is the best location for this 
performance test because of its geographic accessibility, its inherent 
legitimacy, its need for additional assistance, and because “serving and 
improving the legal system through work in the courts’ justice 
initiatives is surely a means to promote and embody the MacCrate 
values.”194 She also suggested that while engaged in public-service-
                                                                                                                                            
to Study the Bar Examination and Other Means of Measuring Lawyer 
Competence, Feb. 2012 at 14-5 [hereinafter NYSBA Report]. 
191 Those concerns included the following: (1) the difficulty of adding this proposal 
to a psychometrically validated exam; (2) the possibility students might not 
understand the benefit of clinical courses so the extra points may not help the 
students who most needed it; (3) the idea that instead of treating this as a bar 
exam issue, a clinic requirement could simply be made a licensing pre-requisite 
and required of all students. Id. at 15. California has proposed a competency 
training proposal that predicates a law license on bar applicants having 
completed, among other things, 15 units of practice-based, experiential course 
work or an apprenticeship equivalent during law school. Amy Yarborough, 
Board Asks for Next Steps in Competency Training Plan, CAL. ST. B.J. (Nov. 
2013), http://www.calbarjournal.com/November2013/TopHeadlines/TH4. The 
proposal also requires “50 hours of legal services devoted to pro bono or modest 
means clients prior to admission or in the first two years of practice and 10 
additional MCLE hours focused on law practice competency training.” Id. 
192 NYBSA Report, supra note 190, at 16. 
193 Comms. on Legal Educ. & Admission to the Bar of the Ass’n of the Bar of the 
City of N.Y. & the N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Public Service Alternative Bar 
Examination (June 14, 2002), http://www.nysba.org/Content/Navigation
Menu/Attorney_Resources/NYSBA_Reports/JointRPT614.pdf; see also Glen, 
Thinking out of the Bar Exam Box, supra note 94; Glen, Rethinking Admission, 
supra note 1. 
194 Glen, Rethinking Admission, supra note 1, at 1723. 
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based lawyering, students would be tested not only on legal analysis, 
problem-solving, and written communication, but also on “oral and 
other forms of written communication, counseling, fact-gathering, 
familiarity with litigation and alternative dispute resolution, and time 
management. All of these skills would, of course, be utilized in the 
context of several bodies of substantive and procedural law, depending 
on the particular court.”195 Students would be directly engaged in 
lawyering tasks and their lawyering skills would be supervised and 
assessed by trained evaluators in a realistic setting in which they 
would demonstrate what they can do, not just what they know. 
Crediting well-supervised practice experiences and offering alternative 
bar exams based on experiential work are ideas bar examiners should 
explore. 
As with the New Hampshire program, these alternatives demand 
more human and other resources to accomplish than does the 
administration and scoring of a bar exam that measures only one form 
of intelligence and a subset of the lawyering skills necessary for 
practice. We do not propose that such alternatives necessarily replace 
the existing exam in its entirety, or that such proposals should be 
adopted in a comprehensive form in all jurisdictions. But neither 
should such proposals be abruptly dismissed or considered to be anti-
intellectual and result-oriented efforts designed to promote diversity 
above competence. Rather, the consideration and development of such 
alternatives is a timely response to both the narrowness of our current 
testing regime and the troubling disparate impact it produces. 
V. CRITIQUING THE LSAT 
The LSAT, like the bar exam, has been a critical evaluative tool on 
the path into the legal profession.196 As he does with respect to the bar 
                                                            
195 Glen, Thinking out of the Bar Exam Box, supra note 94, at 426. 
196 Standard 503 requires use of “a valid and reliable admission test to assist the 
school and the applicant in assessing the applicant’s capability of satisfactorily 
completing the school’s educational program.” Interpretation 503-1 requires that 
a law school using an admission test other than the LSAT “shall establish that 
such other test is a valid and reliable test to assist the school in assessing an 
applicant’s capability to satisfactorily complete the school’s educational 
program.” ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA 
STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS: 
2014-2015 at 33 (2014) available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_
education/resources/standards.html [hereinafter, ABA STANDARDS]. 
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exam, Professor Subotnik suggests that questioning the use of the 
LSAT in the law school admissions process—as SALT has done197—
equates to valuing diversity over merit.198 That view is based on a 
“general presumption that rank-ordering by test score aligns with rank-
order admissions merit” so that “universities’ [or law schools’] 
reliance on non-test score, non-grade admissions criteria is assumed by 
many to be a deviation from a true academic merit-based standard.”199 
Because the LSAT’s presumed power to predict academic success 
underlies reliance upon the test as a “merit-based” admissions 
standard,200 we examine whether the LSAT is, in fact, the best 
predictor of academic success available. And because the purpose of 
law school is to prepare students to be lawyers, we consider how well 
the LSAT predicts success as a lawyer. 
A. What’s Wrong with the LSAT? 
As with the bar exam, the primary problem with the LSAT is the 
way it is used in decision-making, in this instance for law school 
admissions. The LSAT, like the SAT, is modeled on conventional tests 
                                                            
197 Professor Subotnik notes that SALT has supported eliminating the LSAT as a 
required tool in law school admissions. Subotnik, supra note 2, at 379. In fact, 
SALT has primarily argued that the LSAT is misused in admissions. See 
Haddon & Post, supra note 1, at 104 (reprinting SALT statement). SALT also 
included an “if all else fails” argument: 
If law schools continue to compete for distinction through popular 
magazine rankings, where high LSAT scores determine success; if 
there remains an unwillingness to challenge the perception that 
standardized tests measure innate intelligence; if those who 
administer admission programs continue to rely on the LSAT even 
when there is no correlation between test scores and either the 
performance of their students or the professional contributions of 
their graduates; if budgetary constraints are such that a careful, 
‘whole file’ review system is regarded as prohibitively expensive 
and time-consuming, then it may be in the best interests of legal 
education to entirely abandon the Law School Admission Test.  
 Id. A decade later, with law schools relying on LSAT scores more than ever, 
perhaps it is almost time to follow that path, though we would prefer a more 
balanced and nuanced admissions process that considers the LSAT along with 
other factors and the development and reliance on entrance exams that test a 
broader array of relevant intelligence attributes. See infra Parts V.B, V. C. 
198 Subotnik, supra note, 2 at 385. 
199 West-Faulcon, supra note 8, at 1245. 
200 Id. at 1281–82. 
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that measure general cognitive ability.201 The test-taking skills and 
cognitive abilities tested on the LSAT are the same ones that are 
particularly rewarded in traditional first year law school courses, 
which typically assess a narrow range of analytical skills using 
multiple choice and essay or short answer questions administered 
under time pressure.202 It is therefore not surprising that the LSAT is 
predictive of first year grades for some—but by no means all—
students in doctrinal courses.203 But a single measure of cognitive 
ability such as the LSAT fails to fully predict academic 
performance,204 especially when that performance is assessed in ways 
that more closely replicate law practice. 205 Moreover, the LSAT is not 
                                                            
201 Id. at 1240; S. Newsome et al., Assessing the Predictive Value of Emotional 
Intelligence, 29 PERS. & INDIV. DIFFERENCES, 1005, 1008 (2000). 
202 See generally Shultz & Zedeck, supra note 1, at 623. 
203 Abiel Wong, “Boalt-ing” Opportunity? Deconstructing Elite Norms in Law 
School Admissions, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 199, 227 (1999) (noting 
that the LSAT’s correlation co-efficient with first-year grades ranges from .01 to 
.62 depending upon the law school); see Henderson, supra note 95, at 977; 
Haddon & Post, supra note 1, at 54–55. 
“The [LSAT] test score, a product of one three-hour test, has a 
statistically significant correlation to first-year grades and is 
offered as a reliable predictor of whether an applicant will succeed 
in the first year of law school. But even this limited claim is 
contested, and the LSAC itself states that any predictive validity 
must be assessed on an individual school basis.”  
 Id. 
204 Newsome, et al., supra note 201, at 1008 (noting that while cognitive tests 
predict 25% of the variance in academic performance, they leave 75% of that 
variance unexplained); see also infra sections V.B, VI.A (discussing the tests’ 
failure to accurately predict performance for a significant number of students 
and employees). 
205 Curcio, Jones & Washington, Does Practice Make Perfect? An Empirical 
Examination of the Impact of Practice Essays on Essay Exam Performance, 35 
FL. ST. L. REV. 271, 293 (2008) (finding that although LSAT scores correlated 
with first year grades in all doctrinal courses, there was no correlation with 
grades in the first year legal research and writing course); Henderson, supra note 
95, at 976 (finding LSAT score correlated best with in-class timed exams, and 
had virtually no correlation to students’ grades on an appellate brief or oral 
advocacy assessment); Rolando Diaz et al., Cognition, Anxiety, and Prediction 
of Performance in 1st Year Law Students, 90 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 420, 423 
(2001) (finding no correlation between LSAT scores and oral argument grades); 
see also Leah Christensen, Enhancing Law School Success, 33 L. & PSYCHOL. 
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designed to predict success in law practice,206 making it of limited 
value if law schools seek to admit applicants who will be successful 
lawyers, not just successful students. As Supreme Court Justice 
Samuel Alito has recognized, “[l]aw schools put too much emphasis 
on this one multiple choice test. What in life is a multiple choice 
test?”207 
B. Learning from SAT-Optional Schools 
Recognizing the limitations of standardized tests as predictors of 
college success, an increasing number of colleges and universities 
allow applicants the option of having their admissions applications 
evaluated without taking into account either SAT or ACT scores, a 
practice that began thirty years ago and has expanded considerably in 
the last decade. A recent study of 33 colleges and universities using 
this “test optional” policy found little difference in graduation rates or 
cumulative undergraduate GPAs between students who had submitted 
SAT or ACT scores [submitters] and those who were admitted into 
college without consideration of their SAT or ACT scores [non-
submitters]. 208 While for both submitters and non-submitters, high 
school GPA was a consistent and reliable predictor of college 
cumulative GPA,209 for those not submitting SAT scores, the SAT 
scores were particularly unlikely to closely predict their college 
performance, even though the non-submitters’ SAT test scores were 
significantly lower than the scores of the submitters.210 
                                                                                                                                            
REV. 57, 74 (2009) (reporting results of a study in which grades in a lawyering 
skill class were better predictors of class rank than LSAT scores). 
206 Shultz & Zedeck, supra note 1, at 621; Lempert et al., From the Trenches and 
Towers, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 395, 401–02 (2000) (finding that LSAT scores 
and undergraduate grades had “virtually no value as predictors of post-law 
school accomplishments and success”). 
207 Matthew Walther, Sam Alito: A Civil Man, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR, May 
2014, http://spectator.org/articles/58731/sam-alito-civil-man. 
208 WILLIAM C HISS & VALERIE W. FRANKS, DEFINING PROMISE: OPTIONAL 
STANDARDIZED TESTING POLICIES IN AMERICAN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY 
ADMISSIONS at 3 (2014), http://www.nacacnet.org/research/research-data/nacac-
research/Documents/DefiningPromise.pdf. 
209 Id. at 9. 
210 Id. at 10. The scores of non-submitters were available in many instances because 
the institution either collected the scores of non-submitters for research purposes 
after admission or collected the scores from all applicants but kept them isolated 
from the rest of the admissions file for those to be evaluated without 
 
256 UMass Law Review v. 9 | 206 
This large study mirrors the findings of a review of twenty-five 
years of optional testing at Bates College, a highly-ranked and 
academically demanding institution that was an early adopter of test-
optional admissions. Non-submitters earned the same grades and 
graduated at virtually the same rates as submitters.211 Both white and 
non-white students took substantial advantage of the policy, and the 
results for both groups were the same—no difference in grades and 
graduation rates between submitters and non-submitters.212 There was, 
however, a difference in the rates at which submitting and non-
submitting students successfully pursued graduate degrees—especially 
where the career track required a high stakes standardized test for 
admission, (e.g. MBAs, PhDs, MDs and JD’s).213 Given the nature of 
the Bates College study, there is no data to explain that gap (e.g., did 
non-submitting Bates graduates avoid such fields because of the 
entrance testing, or did they fail to apply or were rejected because of 
low test scores?), but the gap led the study’s authors (and the authors 
of this Article) to ask whether graduate schools are admitting the best 
candidates or just the best test-takers?214 
These studies raise profound questions about whether standardized 
tests should play a significant role in admissions decisions at any level. 
Test-optional colleges and universities have opened their doors to 
many who might not otherwise have applied or been accepted. The 33-
institution survey, involving 123,000 students, found that non-
submitters were more likely to be women, first-generation-to-college, 
all categories of minority students, Pell Grant recipients, and students 
with learning differences.215 If such students perform as well in college 
as those with higher standardized test scores, as these two studies 
demonstrate, it suggests that using or heavily weighing cognitive tests 
                                                                                                                                            
consideration of the scores. Looking at available scores at private colleges and 
universities, submitters had SAT scores 149 points higher than non-submitters. 
At public universities, in cases where students were admitted based on high 
school GPAs regardless of test scores, the non-submitters had SAT scores 93 
points lower than the submitters. Id. at 13. 
211 WILLIAM C. HISS & KATE M. DORIA, DEFINING PROMISE: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 
OF OPTIONAL TESTING AT BATES COLLEGE 1984-2009 at 7 (2011), http://www
.npr.org/assets/news/2013/optionaltestingpaper19842009.pdf. 
212 Id. at 5. 
213 Id. at 8–9. 
214 Id. at 9. 
215 HISS & FRANK, supra note 208, at 14. 
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like the SAT, ACT, and LSAT may be unfairly and unreasonably 
undermining the applications of many students who deserve to be, and 
might perform well if they are, admitted. While we know that the 
LSAT, especially in combination with undergraduate GPA, is 
somewhat predictive of law school grades, most of the variation in law 
school performance is not explained by those numbers. 216 Other recent 
studies have demonstrated that undergraduate performance is 
substantially affected by student perceptions of whether or not they 
“belong,” academically, at the institutions they attend and that 
performance dramatically improves when such perceptions are directly 
addressed.217 Reliance on LSAT scores in the admissions process both 
obscures the limited nature of their predictive power and reinforces the 
counterproductive—and self-fulfilling—message to applicants with 
lower test scores that they are less likely to succeed in their studies. 
Perhaps it is time to allow law schools to choose test-optional 
admissions for at least some of their applicants, to invite in law 
schools a change that has produced strong positive results for 
undergraduate institutions and their students, especially those from 
diverse backgrounds. 
When we suggest schools be allowed to experiment with “test 
optional” admissions we are not saying that the LSAT is irrelevant to 
                                                            
216 David A. Thomas, Predicting Academic Performance from LSAT Scores and 
Undergraduate Grade Point Averages: A Comprehensive Study, 35 ARIZ. ST. L. 
J. 1007 (2003) (discussing the predictive power of LSAT scores and UGPAs as 
they relate to first year and cumulative grades of Brigham Young University 
students); see also Lisa Anthony Stilwell, et al., Predictive Validity of the LSAT 
A National Summary of the 2009 and 2010 Correlation Studies, LSAT 
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES at 18 (2011), http://www.lsac.org/docs/default-sou
rce/research-%28lsac-resources%29/tr-11-02.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [hereinafter LSAC 
study] (discussing findings of correlations between LSAT scores and first year 
law school GPAs [FYA] at 170 schools and finding significant variability in 
correlations between schools with an average correlation of LSAT scores and 
UGPA with FYA at .47; an average correlation of LSAT scores alone and FYA 
at .35 and .36; and a correlation of UGPA alone and FYA at .29 and 
.28)[hereinafter LSAC study); Linda Wightman, Beyond FYA: Analysis of the 
Utility of LSAT Scores and UGPA for Predicting Academic Success in Law 
School, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL RESEARCH REPORT 99-05, at 2 
(2000) (finding a correlation between LSAT scores, UGPAs and cumulative law 
school grades). 
217 See Paul Tough, Who Gets to Graduate?, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (May 
15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/magazine/who-gets-to-graduate
.html?_r=0. 
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or should not be used in admissions decisions for any students. Rather, 
as with the bar exam, the argument is that the LSAT has been misused 
because its submission by applicants is mandated by law school 
accreditation standards218 and is relied on too heavily when it is 
used.219 The Law School Admission Council (LSAC), which drafts 
and administers the LSAT, warns that LSAT scores should only be 
used as “one of several criteria for evaluation” of applicants220 and 
“should not be given undue weight solely because it is convenient.”221 
In an article based on research conducted while she was Vice President 
for Testing, Operations, and Research at the Law School Admission 
Council, Linda Wightman noted that “calling on [the LSAT] to do 
more than it was intended to do damages its validity. . . . [A] test that 
does a very good job of measuring a narrow, albeit important, range of 
acquired academic skills cannot serve as a sole determinant in the 
allocation of limited educational opportunity.”222 It appears that many 
law schools ignore such warnings and instead overly rely upon LSAT 
scores, both for the sake of efficiency in reaching admissions decisions 
and because the U.S. News and World Report Rankings depend so 
heavily on the median LSAT scores of admitted students.223 Indeed, to 
                                                            
218 Under Standard 503 of the ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval 
of Law Schools, schools must require each applicant to take “a valid and reliable 
admission test to assist the school and the applicant in assessing the applicant’s 
capability of successfully completing the school’s educational program.” ABA 
STANDARDS, supra note 196, at 33. If a school wants to use a test other than the 
LSAT for this purpose, it must establish that the test is a valid and reliable test to 
assist the school in this fashion. 
219 Haddon & Post, supra note 1, at 56–67. 
220 Law School Admissions Council, LSAC Statement of Good Admission and 
Financial Aid Practices- JD Program, (May 2014), http://www.lsac.org/docs
/default-source/publications-%28lsac-resources%29/statementofgoodadm.pdf. 
221 Id. 
222 Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School 
Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 29–31 (1997). 
223 Paula Lustbader, Painting by the Numbers: The Art of Providing Inclusive Law 
School Admissions to Ensure Full Representation in the Profession, 40 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 71, 114–117 (2012). LSAT scores account for 12.5 percent of the 
overall score used to rank law schools. Wendy Espland & Michael Sauder, 
Rankings and Diversity, 18 S. CAL. L. REV. & SOC. JUSTICE 587, 593 (2009). 
LSAT scores are “one of the very few [ranking] variables over which the law 
school has some input or control [and this] puts tremendous pressure on law 
schools to improve their median LSAT score to improve their relative rank.” 
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boost their rankings, schools have directed a significant amount of 
scholarship funding to induce students with higher LSAT scores to 
enroll.224 “Over-reliance on the LSAT thus has had the pernicious 
effect of reversing the long-established policy of offering scholarships 
to low-income students. This, in turn, contributes to the declining 
enrollment of low income and minority students.”225 
                                                                                                                                            
Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Destruction of the Holistic Approach to Admissions, 
81 IND. L. J. 309, 311–12 (2006). 
224 David Yellen, The Impact of Rankings and Rules on Legal Education Reform, 
45 CONN. L. REV. 1389, 1395 (2013) (“The use of merit scholarships to attract 
students with high LSAT scores and UGPAs has exploded in the USNWR era, 
leaving far less money available for need-based aid.”); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, 
FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (Univ. of Chicago Press 2012) (observing that in a quest 
for US News rankings, law schools have shifted scholarship money from 
helping those who have significant financial needs to awarding the money to 
those with high LSAT scores); William D. Henderson & Andrew P Morris, 
Student Quality As Measured by LSAT Scores, 81 IND. L. J. 163, n. 5 (2006) 
(citing to comments by deans who note that they direct significant scholarship 
money to students with high LSAT scores). The practice of relying on 
standardized test scores as a proxy for merit in disbursing scholarship money is 
questionable given the recent studies that indicate students who do not submit 
test scores for undergraduate admissions perform as well as those with much 
higher test scores. See HISS & FRANK, supra note 208, at 15 (finding that only 
5,046 out of 27,000 students who received merit awards were non-submitters 
with below-average-testing and yet that cohort of non-submitters earned slightly 
higher cumulative GPAs and graduated at rates 6% higher than submitters). 
225 Kevin R. Johnson, The Importance of Diversity of Students and Faculties in Law 
Schools, One Dean’s Perspective, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1549, 1576–77 (2011) ( “at a 
minimum, the U.S. News rankings methodology requires law school 
administrators to carefully weigh the ranking implications of any measures – 
such as less reliance on LSAT scores in admissions decisions designed to 
increase diversity among the student body.”); see also Law School Admissions 
Council, LSAT As Predictors of Law School Performance (2014), 
http://www.lsac.org/docs/default-source/jd-docs/lsat-score-predictors-of-perfor
mance.pdf. 
The correlation between LSAT scores and first-year law school 
grades varies from one law school to another (as does the 
correlation between GPA and first-year law school grades). During 
2010, validity studies were conducted for 189 law schools. 
Correlations between LSAT scores and first-year law school 
grades ranged from .12 to .56 (median is .36).  
 Id. 
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C. Broadening the Admissions Process 
While it once seemed to be generally believed that success in 
school could be at least somewhat predicted through measuring 
general intelligence,226 in recent years researchers have determined 
that successful performance depends on multiple kinds of intelligence. 
Instead of focusing solely on what now may be called “analytic 
intelligence,”227 they expand their vision to include other qualities such 
as “practical intelligence”228 and “creative intelligence.”229 Tests have 
been developed to assess these multiple aspects of intelligence, and the 
tests have been shown experimentally to better predict scholastic 
performance in college than tests focused on general intelligence.230 
The tests of one researcher, Robert Sternberg, “were shown to have 
twice the practical predictive power of the SAT alone.”231 
Analytic, creative, and practical intelligence all seem likely to be 
useful attributes for learning and practicing law. However, like its SAT 
counterpart, the LSAT tests primarily analytical intelligence232 and has 
                                                            
226 This attribute is sometimes called “g,” and is represented in exams such as the 
SAT and tests popularly known as IQ tests. See West-Faulcon, supra note 8, at 
1256–64(discussing the origin of the “g” factor tests and standardized tests’ 
influence on the development of IQ tests as well as the SAT). Although 
providing some mathematical basis for predicting success, SAT scores explain 
only about 13% of the variance in first-year college grades, leaving 87% of the 
variation unexplained by the test scores. See id. at 1267. 
227 Sternberg, Rainbow Project, supra note 1, at 324 (“[the ability to] analyze, 
evaluate, judge, or compare and contrast”). 
228 Id. at 325 (“[the ability to] implement, apply, or put into practice ideas in real-
world context”). 
229 Id. (“[the ability to] “create, invent, discover, support or hypothesize”). 
230 See Karen Van Der Zee et al., The Relationship of Emotional Intelligence with 
Academic Intelligence and the Big Five, 16 EDUC. J. PERS. 103, 104 (2002) 
(noting the various measures that have been developed to assess social 
intelligence, practical intelligence and emotional intelligence); Sternberg, 
Rainbow Project, supra note 1, at 324–35. 
231 West-Falcon, supra note 8, at 1279. 
232 “The LSAT is a ‘paper-and-pencil’ test that basically measures analytic and 
logical reasoning, along with reading.” Shultz & Zedeck, supra note 1, at 622 
(citing to the Law School Admissions Council 1999); see also Wendy M. 
Williams, Consequences of How We Define and Assess Intelligence, 2 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 506, 509 (1996) ( “Tests such as the Scholastic Assessment 
Test (SAT) and Preliminary Scholastic Assessment Test (PSAT), the GRE, the 
Law School Admission Test (LSAT), and the Graduate Management Admission 
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limited ability to predict who will succeed in law school233 or in law 
practice. With a goal of developing a better method of identifying 
which law school applicants have the qualities beyond cognitive 
ability needed to become responsible, effective and competent 
lawyers, Professors Marjorie Shultz and Sheldon Zedeck built upon 
the work done by Professor Sternberg and others to identify 26 
lawyering “effectiveness” factors,234 to confirm the usefulness of the 
factors to explain lawyers’ on-the-job performance,235 and to find and 
develop assessment instruments that can test for non-cognitive factors 
such as interpersonal and communication skills, practical judgment, 
and creativity.236 Just as Professor Sternberg developed tests that could 
supplement the SAT to better predict college performance, Professors 
Shultz and Zedeck’s goal was to develop a law school admissions 
assessment instrument that could supplement the LSAT to better 
predict professional performance. The assessment measures they 
identified correlate significantly with the kinds of skills and qualities 
effective lawyers need.237 
The primary goal for researchers like Professors Sternberg, Shultz, 
and Zedeck has been to develop better assessments so that admissions 
decisions based on merit can be made more accurately and therefore 
more fairly. They do not suggest eliminating the LSAT, but they argue 
that it should be supplemented with tests that measure a wider range of 
the skills and abilities effective lawyers need238 and better predict who 
                                                                                                                                            
Test (GMAT), for example, all measure verbal and mathematical knowledge and 
reasoning.”). 
233 See Law School Admission Council, supra note 225; see also Sternberg, 
Rainbow Project, supra note 1, at 324 (noting that traditional tests primarily 
measure analytical skills, but that success is attained through a balance of 
analytical, practical, and creative intelligence).  
234 Shultz & Zedeck, supra note 1, at 630. 
235 Id. at 637–638. 
236 Id. at 625. 
237 Id. at 642. 
238   Id. at 630. Similar efforts are being or have been considered in graduate, 
business, and medical school admissions. See, e.g., Association of American 
Medical Colleges, MR5: 5th Comprehensive Review of the Medical College 
Admission Test (MCAT), AAMC (2011), https://www.aamc.org/initiatives/mr5; 
Association of American Medical Colleges, Innovation Lab to Explore 
Measures of Personal Characteristics and Skills, AAMC (2009),  
https://www.aamc.org/initiatives/mr5/about_mr5/64636/innovation_lab.html; 
Alison Damast, The GMAT Gets a Makeover, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
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will succeed. The broader assessments proposed for both college and 
law school admissions have the added benefit of producing fewer 
performance gaps by race and therefore diminish the disparate impact 
of relying exclusively on the analytic measurements. The Shultz-
Zedeck tests, for instance, “showed few racial or gender subgroup 
differences, creating the potential to reduce adverse impact through the 
use of new tests.”239 
Professor Subotnik dismisses the Shultz-Zedeck research on the 
grounds that the lawyering effectiveness factors do not encompass 
qualities such as “learned in the law.”240 But knowing the law—if that 
is what Professor Subotnik means when he uses that term—is part of 
the many Schultz-Zedeck effectiveness factors such as skills in legal 
analysis and reasoning, problem-solving, and researching the law.241 
The work of Professors Sternberg, Shultz, and Zedeck represent 
developing, not definitive, responses to the limitations of current 
admissions testing and its disparate impact. They have shown that 
testing alternatives exist, which, when added to existing cognitive 
tests, offer the possibility of predicting ability to succeed as a lawyer 
better than the primarily or solely cognitive tests now in use and they 
do so without the disparate impact produced by current testing. It is 
time to rethink the assumption that earning a higher score on a 
“particular mental test” indicates that the test-taker is more qualified 
                                                                                                                                            
(June 4, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com /bschools/content/jun2010/bs20
100624_048037.htm; Lucia Graves, More Changes Ahead for the GRE Test, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (May 27, 2008, 5:35),  
http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/on-education/2008/05/27/more-change
s-ahead-for-the-gre-test. 
239 Id. at 654. 
240 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 383. Professor Subotnik also dismissed Schultz and 
Zedeck’s work on the ground that their tests “may be developed through 
instruction.” Id. at 383. Yet, even if taken as true, this does not distinguish it 
from existing tests such as the SAT, LSAT and Bar Exam, which we know are 
coachable and the basis of a lucrative test-preparation industry. Those who can 
afford to pay for private coaches can achieve significant test score 
improvements. See JOHN P. HAUSKNECHT ET AL., RETESTING IN SELECTION: A 
META-ANALYSIS OF PRACTICE EFFECTS FOR TESTS OF COGNITIVE ABILITY 
(2006), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&
context=articles. 
241 Shultz & Zedeck, supra note 1, at 630 (listing the factors identified as important 
to lawyer effectiveness). 
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than someone earning a lower score but perhaps possessing untested 
qualifications to succeed as an effective, practicing lawyer.242 
VI. TEST-TAKING AND ECONOMICS 
Professor Subotnik argues that when we ignore tests of cognitive 
abilities, we enter economically perilous territory,243 pointing to 
studies correlating job performance to general intelligence (“g”) test 
scores, as well as findings from a study undertaken by the 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD].244 
In this section, we address those arguments. 
A. Cognitive Tests and Job Performance 
Professor Subotnik argues that in a quest for a diverse workforce, 
America has turned into a country in which diversity trumps job 
qualifications.245 He cites Professor Amy Wax,246 who reviews studies 
about the predictive force of cognitive tests as they relate to job 
performance,247 and argues that employers are hiring unqualified 
workers due to fear of Title VII litigation.248 Using Professor Wax’s 
work to buttress his arguments, Professor Subotnik suggests employers 
are forced to choose unqualified diverse workers, which negatively 
impacts the economy. 249 
This argument rests on presumptions that cognitive tests alone best 
predict job performance and that diversity considerations require 
ignoring rank order on cognitive tests when making hiring decisions, 
                                                            
242 See West-Faulcon, supra note 8, at 1295 (arguing that fairness in selective 
admissions processes requires one to consider that the scientific data does not 
support the assumption that those with higher test scores on cognitive tests are 
necessarily the most qualified applicants). 
243 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 344–45, 392–94. 
244 Id. at 393. 
245 Id. at 361. 
246 Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621 (2011). 
247 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 356. 
248 Id. at 359 (citing Wax supra note 246, at 694–95). 
249 See id. at 361 (noting “[a]t the macro level in the United States there is, 
unavoidably in Wax’s words, a ‘validity-diversity tradeoff’”); see also id. at 
389–94; see generally id. at 359–364 (using Professor Wax’s work to suggest 
that jobs are going to unqualified workers because employers seek to avoid 
litigation and create a diverse workforce). 
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resulting in the hiring of less qualified workers. That analysis is flawed 
in several ways. 
First, while cognitive tests have some value in predicting job 
performance—as we have seen with respect to the firefighting test in 
New Haven, the bar exam, and the LSAT250—they are far from perfect 
predictors. As Professor Subotnik himself acknowledges, Professor 
Wax’s estimate that the tests predict job performance for 
approximately fifty percent of the candidates is likely an over-
estimation.251 Many researchers suggest that cognitive tests predict 
performance for about twenty to twenty-five percent of the 
workforce,252 while others put the tests’ predictive ability even 
lower.253 If the tests predict performance for twenty to twenty-five 
percent of workers, then for close to four out of five job candidates, 
cognitive test scores do not accurately predict ability to succeed in a 
given job. 
Second, as we have also seen with respect to the legal profession, 
cognitive abilities are not all that it takes to succeed in the workplace. 
Practical problems encountered on the job often require the ability to 
recognize problems that are ill-defined, require information-seeking, 
may have multiple solutions and multiple paths to a solution, may 
require reliance on information learned in every-day experience, and 
potentially require motivation and personal involvement, a different 
set of skills than those involved in solving academic problems.254 
Abilities such as interpersonal communication skills, practical 
judgment, and creativity play a role in successful job performance.255 
                                                            
250 Sternberg & Hedlund, supra note 1, at 143. 
251 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 360. 
252 Sternberg & Hedlund, supra note 1, at 144. 
253 See Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, Introduction to THE BLACK-WHITE 
TEST SCORE GAP 1, 15 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., Brookings 
Inst. Press 1998) (noting that “test scores explain only 10 to 20 percent of the 
variation in job performance”); Wendy M. Williams, Consequences of How We 
Define and Assess Intelligence, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 506, 511 (1996) 
(“it is clear that between 75% and 96% of the variance in real-world criteria 
such as job performance cannot be accounted for by individual differences in 
intelligence test scores”). 
254 Robert J. Sternberg & Richard K. Wagner, The g-ocentric View of Intelligence 
and Job Performance is Wrong, 2 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 1, 2 
(1993). 
255 Shultz & Zedeck, supra note 1 at 625; see generally Flip Lievens & David 
Chan, Practical Intelligence, Emotional Intelligence and Social Intelligence, in 
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Professors Barrick and Mount found that conscientiousness, 
extraversion, emotional stability, agreeableness, and openness to 
experience relate to job performance, with the strength of that 
relationship depending upon the occupation and the job task.256 Other 
studies have found correlations between job performance and 
emotional257 and practical intelligence. 258 Simply put, the best workers 
may not always be those who performed best on cognitive tests.259 If 
those tests are used to decide who gets hired, companies may fail to 
hire someone who is well-qualified to perform the job and adds an 
important perspective to the work team. 
                                                                                                                                            
HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYEE SELECTION 339 (James L. Farr & Nancy T. Tippins 
eds., 2010) (discussing the various conceptualizations of intelligence, the 
instruments used to measure these intelligences, and the correlation between 
these various conceptualizations of intelligence and job performance prediction). 
256 Murray R. Barrick & Michael K. Mount, The Big Five Personality Dimensions 
and Job Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 44 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (1991); 
see also Nathan R. Kuncel et. al., Individual Differences as Predictors of Work, 
Educational and Broad Life Outcomes, 49 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL 
DIFFERENCES 331, 334–35 (2010) (discussing various studies that indicate 
personality factors can be assessed and the assessments indicate a strong 
correlation between various personality factors and job performance). 
257 See generally Lievens & Chan, supra note 255. Lievens and Chan describe two 
types of emotional intelligence. One type is assessed via performance based tests 
and deals with the ability to accurately perceive others’ emotions from 
behavioral and other non-verbal cues, to use emotions to assist in thinking and 
problem solving, to analyze emotions and think about how they affect outcomes, 
and to manage one’s emotions. Id. at 340–41. The other type of emotional 
intelligence is measured via self-reporting instruments that assess the ability to 
“recognize, understand, and use emotional information about oneself or others 
that leads to or causes effective or superior performance.” Id. at 341. See also 
Shaun Newsome et. al, Assessing the Predictive Value of Emotional 
Intelligence, 29 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1005 (2000). 
258 Professor Sternberg coined the term “practical intelligence” in order to describe 
how people apply their abilities to real world problems they confront on the job 
or at home. See Sternberg, Rainbow Project, supra note 1, at 325. 
259 See Sternberg & Hedlund, supra note 1 at 144 (reviewing literature that 
discusses limitations and controversies surrounding sole reliance on “general 
intelligence” to predict job performance); see also Karen Van der Zee et al., The 
Relationship of Emotional Intelligence with Academic Intelligence and the Big 
Five, 16 EUR. J. PERS. 103, 103 (2002) (noting that sometimes those who do 
very well in school are unsuccessful at work, despite having strong intellectual 
abilities). 
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B. The Role of Unconscious Bias in Workplace Performance 
Evaluations 
The arguments about the connection between cognitive test scores 
and job performance also ignore the role bias plays in workplace 
evaluations. Professor Subotnik contends that lower test scores 
correlate to lower job performance, that measures of job performance 
strongly correlate to “objective” measures such as work errors, and 
that racial bias plays only a marginal role in evaluation of workplace 
performance. He concludes that employers hire less effective workers 
when they hire diverse candidates with lower cognitive test scores.260 
A recent study demonstrates that implicit racial bias,261 combined with 
confirmation bias, may in fact play a much larger role in workplace 
evaluations than acknowledged by Professor Subotnik or the studies 
on which he relies. 
Confirmation bias is the often unconscious tendency to seek or 
interpret evidence in ways that conform to one’s existing beliefs or 
expectations.262 Confirmation bias explains how our unconscious 
perceptions affect our evaluations – e.g. we see weaker performance 
when we expect to see weaker performance and vice versa. 263 If one 
holds unconsciously biased attitudes about a group of people, one’s 
seemingly objective assessment of people in that group may be tainted 
by confirmation bias. A recent study illustrates how confirmation bias 
in the legal workplace may result in lower evaluations for African-
American associates than for Caucasian associates for exactly the 
same work product.264 Five partners from five different firms drafted a 
                                                            
260 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 363–64. 
261 L. Song Richardson, Cognitive Bias, Police Character and the Fourth 
Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 267, 271 (2012) (“Implicit racial bias describes a 
psychological process in which a person’s non-conscious racial beliefs 
(stereotypes) and attitudes (prejudices) affect her or his behaviors, perceptions 
and judgments in ways that she or he are largely unaware of and typically, 
unable to control.”). 
262 See generally, Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous 
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. OF GEN. PSYCHOL 175 (1998) (explaining 
confirmation biases and reviewing evidence of, and explanations for, this bias). 
263 Id. 
264 NEXTIONS LLC, YELLOW PAPER SERIES: WRITTEN IN BLACK & WHITE 
EXPLORING CONFIRMATION BIAS IN RACIALIZED PERCEPTIONS OF WRITING 
SKILLS at 5 (2014), http://www.nextions.com/wp-content/files_mf/13972
237592014040114WritteninBlackandWhiteYPS.pdf. 
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legal research memo, deliberately inserting grammatical, factual and 
analytical errors.265 The memo then was analyzed by 53 other law firm 
partners who agreed to participate in a “writing analysis study.” 266 All 
were told the memo was drafted by a male third-year associate who 
matriculated from NYU Law School. Half were told the associate was 
Caucasian; the other half were told the associate was African 
American.267 The identical memo averaged statistically-significant 
lower ratings for the African American associate than for the 
Caucasian associate.268 The qualitative comments were also more 
positive for the Caucasian memo writer,269 and, on average, the 
reviewers found significantly more errors in the memo written by the 
“African American” than they found in the memo written by the 
“Caucasian” writer.270 The underlying results—that implicit and 
confirmation bias appear to play a role in workplace evaluations—
appeared also in another study in which minority summer associates 
were consistently evaluated more negatively than their majority 
counterparts; the researchers found that blind evaluations of work 
product were generally more positive for minorities and women and 
less positive for majority men than when the identity of the individuals 
being evaluated was known.271 
If evaluators unconsciously find more errors under the influence of 
implicit and confirmation bias, this will affect their “objective” 
evaluation of the quality of the work produced. The conclusions that 
workplace performance confirms the validity of cognitive testing and 
                                                            
265 Id. 
266 Originally 60 different partners were recruited: 23 women, 37 men, 21 self-
identifying as being a racial/ethnic minority and 39 self-identifying as 
Caucasian. Of  those 60, 53 completed the editing and rating of the memo. Id. at 
2. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. at 3. 
269 The comments about the Caucasian writer were: “generally good writer but 
needs to work . . .” ; “has potential”; “good analytical skills”. The African-
American writer received comments such as: “needs lots of work”; “can’t 
believe he went to NYU”; “average at best.” Id. at 4. 
270 For the “African American” writer, on average reviewers found 5.8/7.0 
spelling/grammar errors; 4.9/6.0 technical writing errors, and 3.9/5.0 errors in 
facts. For the “Caucasian” writer, reviewers found 2.9/7.0 spelling/grammar 
errors; 4.1/6.0 technical writing errors and 3.2/5.0 errors in facts. Id. at 5. 
271 Id. at 5. 
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that discounting cognitive tests undermines economic productivity 
thus rest on suspect assumptions about the objectivity of workplace 
performance measures. 
C. The Economic Value of Diversity 
Finally, the argument that diversity concerns lead employers to 
make “wrong” decisions about hiring ignores the economic value to 
employers of diversity in the workplace. Many employers find that a 
diverse work force creates a competitive marketplace advantage 
because it helps companies better understand and serve a growingly 
diverse customer base.272 As noted by Nancy Levit five years ago, 
“[n]umerous studies, both in this country and others, have 
demonstrated that ‘diversity is good for business.’ . . . The market 
arguments in favor of diversity are compelling.”273 
The same is true for the legal system, as recognized by the ABA in 
a 2010 report developed as the result of an ABA Presidential Diversity 
Initiative. Articulating democracy, business, leadership, and 
demographic rationales for diversity, the report noted that 
[w]ithout a diverse bench and bar, the rule of law is weakened as 
the people see and come to distrust their exclusion from the 
mechanisms of justice. . . . A diverse workforce within legal and 
judicial offices exhibits different perspectives, life experiences, 
linguistic and cultural skills, and knowledge about international 
markets, legal regimes, different geographies, and current 
events. . . It makes good business sense to hire lawyers who reflect 
the diversity of citizens, clients, and customers from around the 
globe. Indeed, corporate clients increasingly require lawyer 
diversity and will take their business elsewhere if it is not 
provided. . . As Justice O’Connor reminded us in her opinion in the 
Grutter case, this society draws its leaders from the ranks of the 
legal profession and that is one reason why diversity is a 
constitutionally protected principle and practice.274 
In the legal profession, as elsewhere, economic, and other interests, are 
often best served by having a diverse workforce.275 
                                                            
272 Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 
49 B.C. L. REV. 367, 424–27 (2008). 
273 Id. at 424–25. 
274 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION: THE NEXT 
STEPS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9–10 (2010). 
275 Cruz Reynoso & Cory Amron, Diversity in Legal Education: A Broader View, A 
Deeper Commitment, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 491, 505 (2002). 
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In sum, the connection between cognitive test scores and job 
performance is not nearly as strong as Professor Subotnik assumes. 
When cognitive tests are supplemented with assessments of other 
factors, such as practical or emotional intelligence, employers can 
better predict who will be a successful employee—as well as minimize 
the disparate impact of the racial gap in test scores. 276 It is not an “all 
or nothing” question, as Professor Subotnik suggests. Rather, like the 
arguments about tests that determine who will be a lawyer, it is a 
question of how much weight should be given to tests that do not 
perfectly predict performance, especially in light of potentially viable 
alternatives that can supplement the tests and improve their predictive 
abilities. 
D. OECD study 
Professor Subotnik supports his argument that we ignore cognitive 
test scores at our economic peril in part by citing an OECD277 study, 
which suggests a relationship between cognitive skills of a nation’s 
student population and that nation’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).278 The OECD report is part of the OECD’s Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) which “represents a 
commitment by governments to monitor outcomes of education 
systems in terms of student achievement, within a common 
international framework.”279 PISA attempts to assess young people’s 
reading, math and science literacy skills, across national boundaries.280 
The OECD report, to which Professor Subotnik cites, compared 15 
                                                            
276 Shultz & Zedeck, supra note 1, at 625; Sternberg & Hedlund, supra note 1, at 
153; see also James Clevenger et. al, Incremental Validity of Situational 
Judgment Tests, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 410 (2001) (finding situational 
judgment tests were a valuable additional predictor of job performance). 
277 Subotnik, supra note 2, at 393; see also ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE HIGH COST OF LOW EDUCATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE: THE LONG-RUN IMPACT OF IMPROVING PISA SCORES (2010), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/pisa/44417824.pdf [hereinafter OECD 
REPORT] (assessing the test scores of fifteen year olds from participating 
countries). 
278 OECD REPORT, supra note 277, at 16–17. 
279 Id. at 3. 
280 ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, MEASURING 
STUDENT KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT 9 
(1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/edu/school/programmeforinternational
studentassessmentpisa/33693997.pdf. 
270 UMass Law Review v. 9 | 206 
year olds’ test scores with their countries’ GDP and found a 
correlation between cognitive math and science scores and GDP.281 
They then extrapolated that finding to suggest that improving 
cognitive test scores would result in higher GDP.282 That claim is open 
to question. 
The test methodology underlying the OECD Report has been 
criticized by numerous academics.283 Moreover, the claims that test 
scores relate to GDP and that raising test scores can lead to an increase 
in GDP are controversial. As the OECD researchers themselves note, 
even if cognitive skill levels, as measured by the PISA test, correlate to 
GDP it is hard to prove that higher cognitive skill levels produce 
higher GDP.284 Two studies found that when one controls for variables 
typically used when making international comparisons, the strong 
association between PISA cognitive test scores and GDP per capita 
disappeared. 285 GDP likely depends upon multiple variables working 
together.286 Again, we do not argue that cognitive skills are 
unimportant. We, and others who criticize overreliance on 
standardized tests, are not “undermining the case for the highest 
educational standards.”287 Rather, we suggest that it is a mistake to 
over-emphasize the value of standardized cognitive tests in 
considering how to improve GDP, just as it is a mistake to look at only 
cognitive test results to determine who is likely to succeed in school or 
a job. We should instead recognize that a country’s economic success 
is based upon many different factors, only some of which may be 
measured by particular tests. 
                                                            
281 OECD REPORT, supra note 277, at 17. 
282 Id. at 6. 
283 See, e.g., William Stewart, Is Pisa Fundamentally Flawed, TESCONNECT (Dec. 
4, 2013), http://www.tes.co.uk/article.aspx?storycode=6344672 (outlining 
various critiques of the test and noting that the test questions used vary between 
students and between countries, thus rendering comparisons meaningless). 
284 OECD REPORT, supra note 277, at 17–20 (reviewing issues relating to 
causality). 
285 See Shiu Sheng Chen & Ming-Ching Luoh, Are Mathematics and Science Test 
Scores Good Indicators of Labor Force Quality?, 96 SOC. INDICATOR RES., 96, 
133, 138–143 (2010); Chong Ho Yu, Samuel DiGangi, & Angel Jannasch-
Pennell et al., A Time-Lag Analysis of the Relationships Among PISA Scores, 
Scientific Research Publication, and Economic Performance, SOC. INDICATOR 
RES. 317, 329–30 (2012). 
286 Yu, et al., supra note 285, at 329. 
287 See Subotnik, supra note 2, at 394. 
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VII. TEST-TAKING AND RACIAL GAPS 
Underlying the argument about the meaning of and appropriate 
response to racial gaps in test results is the acknowledgment and 
understanding of the gap itself. We have explained elsewhere that the 
test scores should be used only as part of a broader decision-making 
paradigm. But what does the existence of the gap suggest about the 
value of the tests themselves? We end this Article with a discussion of 
explanations offered for the test-score gaps between white and 
minority test-takers to reinforce our conclusion that decision-makers 
should not use the scores as a decisive factor for hiring, promotion, 
school admission, or licensing without exploring more fully the 
validity and scope of the tests, and considering alternative ways to 
measure merit. 
The difference between results for white and minority—especially 
African-American—test-takers is seen as early as pre-school and 
continues through adulthood. 288 The reasons for the gaps remain 
elusive, as does the remedy. Some assert definitively dismissed 
explanations based on belief in inherent genetic differences between 
different racial populations.289 Some suggest societal explanations, 
including subpar schools,290 inadequately prepared teachers,291 
insufficiently challenging curricula,292 unequal treatment by and 
                                                            
288 Jencks & Phillips, supra note 253, at 1. 
289 See generally RICHARD HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: 
INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994); see also 
Richard E. Nesbitt, Race, Genetics and IQ, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE 
GAP, supra note 253, at 86–101. 
290 Roy L. Brooks, American Democracy and Higher Education for Black 
Americans: The Lingering Effects Theory, 7 J.L. SOC. CHALLENGES 1, 65 
(2005). 
291 See generally LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, TEACHER QUALITY AND STUDENT 
ACHIEVEMENT: A REVIEW OF STATE POLICY EVIDENCE (1999), available at 
http://www.politicalscience.uncc.edu/godwink/PPOL8687/WK11March%2029
%20Teachers/Darling-Hammond%20Review%20essay%20on%20teacher%20
quality%20and%20outcomes.pdf (discussing how increasing investment in 
teacher quality leads to improved student performance and how economically 
disadvantaged and minority students have limited access to the most qualified 
teachers). 
292 Brooks, supra note 290, at 65 (noting that black students are less likely to be 
enrolled in AP and honors level courses than their white counterparts). 
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expectations from teachers,293 weak or missing educational support at 
home,294 and socioeconomic differences.295 Some argue that the 
problem is the failure of African American youth to work as hard as 
their white counterparts because due to a history of discrimination they 
“began to doubt their own intellectual ability, began to define 
academic success as white people’s prerogative and began to 
discourage their peers, perhaps unconsciously, from emulating white 
people in academic striving, i.e. from ‘acting white.’”296 Some suggest 
that test deficiencies cause some of the disparity—that is, that the tests 
themselves are racially biased.297 
Another explanation is “stereotype threat,” a term coined by 
Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson to explain their findings that “the 
existence of a negative stereotype about a group to which one belongs 
means that in situations where it is potentially applicable, one risks 
                                                            
293 See generally Ronald F. Ferguson, Teachers’ Perceptions and Expectations and 
the Black-White Test Score Gap, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra 
note 253, at 273–314 (discussing various studies about teachers’ perceptions and 
expectations and concluding that “teacher’s perceptions, expectations, and 
behaviors probably do help to sustain, and perhaps even to expand, the black-
white test score gap”). 
294 See generally Meredith Phillips et al, Family Background, Parenting Practices, 
and the Black-White Test Score Gap, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, 
supra note 253, at 103–48 (suggesting that parenting practices play a role in test 
score differences). 
295 Larry V. Hedges & Amy Nowell, Black-White Test Score Convergence Since 
1965, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 253, at 149–81 
(reviewing the literature and statistics and concluding that historically, parental 
education and income have played a role in partially explaining test score gaps). 
296 Signithia Fordham & John U. Ogbu, Black Students’ School Success: Coping 
with the “Burden of ‘Acting White’”, 18 URB. REV. 176, 177 (1986). This theory 
has been, at least implicitly, endorsed by Professor Subotnik. See Subotnik, 
supra note 2, at 388 (suggesting grades are a result of ambition, “stick-to-it-
iveness, and attention to detail”); id. at 389 (“we do not know how to motivate 
our black youth to earn high grades”). The theory has been discounted by other 
social scientists. See Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, The Burden of “Acting 
White”: Do Black Adolescents Disparage Academic Achievement, in THE 
BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 253, at 375–400. Professors Cook 
and Ludwig’s conclusions based upon the National Educational Longitudinal 
Study have been challenged by Professor Ferguson—a challenge that the authors 
respond to in their chapter. Id. at 394–98. 
297 Jencks & Phillips, supra note 253, at 12–15. 
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confirming that stereotype, both to oneself and to others.”298 Through a 
series of experiments they confirmed that “making African Americans 
more conscious of negative stereotypes about their intellectual ability 
as a group can depress their test performance relative to that of 
whites.”299 A statement to black Stanford students as seemingly 
innocuous as telling them they were about to take a diagnostic test of 
their academic abilities led the students to perform significantly worse 
than when the same test was described as a laboratory problem-solving 
task.300 They found that merely asking African American test-takers to 
report their race was enough to impair their performance, even when 
the test was not described as a measure of ability.301 Steele and 
Aronson found that “[S]tereotype threat seems to exert its influence by 
reducing efficiency. Participants who experience stereotype threat 
spend more time doing fewer items less accurately.”302 Their work 
suggests stereotype threat lowers the scores of even, or perhaps 
especially, high achieving black students on verbal tests akin to the 
SAT,303 and has implications that may help explain the test score gaps 
on tests such as the SAT, LSAT, GRE, and even the bar exam.304 The 
existence of stereotype threat has been supported by a wide range of 
empirical research on everything from performance on math tests by 
women and white men305 to academic performance by athletes.306 
                                                            
298 Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Test 
Performance of Academically Successful African Americans, in THE BLACK-
WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 253, at 422. 
299 Id. at 422. 
300 Id. at 409. 
301 Id. at 421 (discussing the results of a difficult verbal test). 
302 Id. at 423. 
303 See id. at 424 (discussing how the results from their tests relate to the SAT 
scores of the test subjects). 
304 See, e.g., id. at 425 (“[W]ould the results hold for other kinds of tests? . . . Our 
theory predicts that one would find the same results. . .”). 
305 Joshua Aronson et al., When White Men Can’t Do Math: Necessary and 
Sufficient Factors in Stereotype Threat, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 29, 
29 (1999) (finding that activating stereotypes produced lower performance by 
white males on math tests); cf. Catherine Good et al., Problems in the Pipeline: 
Stereotype Threat and Women’s Achievement in High-Level Math Courses, 29 J. 
APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 17, 25 (2008) (finding that even amongst 
highly qualified women, stereotype threat affects test performance). 
306 See Jeff Stone, A Hidden Toxicity in the Term “Student-Athlete”: Stereotype 
Threat for Athletes in the College Classroom, 2 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 
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Whatever the explanation for the test gap on standardized tests, the 
important point is that the most likely explanation is not inherent 
inferiority of those who perform less well, but some combination of 
factors that depress performance on cognitive tests. If cognitive test 
performance were a perfect—or even a very good—predictor of 
performance, perhaps the response should be remedial work to 
improve performance on the test itself. But we know that cognitive 
tests are far from perfect predictors of the best performers, and 
certainly far from infallible in separating those who can succeed from 
those who can’t. That is true for academic performance307 as well as 
for job performance.308 Indeed, Jencks and Phillips note that “test 
scores explain only 10 to 20 percent of the variation in job 
performance” and, of equal importance, that “blacks are far less 
disadvantaged on the non-cognitive determinants of job performance 
than on the cognitive ones.”309 In a statement echoing our own claims 
in this article, they write that 
if racial fairness means that blacks and whites who could do a job 
equally well must have an equal chance of getting the job, a 
selection system that emphasizes test scores is almost always 
unfair to most blacks (and to everyone else with low test 
scores). . . .[Relying on cognitive test scores] forces blacks to pay 
for the fact that social scientists have unusually good measure of a 
trait on which blacks are unusually disadvantaged.310 
                                                                                                                                            
179 (2012) (discussing the role stereotype threat may play on academic 
performance of those designated “student-athletes”). 
307 Brooks, supra note 290, at 63–64 (citing Christopher Jencks, Racial Bias in 
Testing, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 253, at 65). 
Many students, black or white, at academically demanding 
colleges outperform their SAT scores. For example, in one study of 
such schools, students admitted with an ‘unacceptable’ SAT score 
of 1,000 ‘earned grades averaging roughly B’, while students 
admitted with scores at the school-wide average of 1289 ‘earned 
college grades averaging roughly B+ . . . . Anyone who has graded 
undergraduates knows that this is not a large difference. Indeed, it 
is the smallest difference that most college grading systems bother 
to record.’ 
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309 Id. at 15. 
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If we know of, or can develop, tests that account for non-cognitive 
factors that help lead to and explain success, fairness dictates that we 
expand our test-taking universe to encompass them—especially if 
those additional tests reduce the race gap in admissions, licensing, and 
employment decisions. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Given the existing gaps in cognitive test scores—including scores 
on the LSAT and bar exam—and their inadequacy in assessing merit, 
the critical question is whether we award admissions slots and jobs 
based on those test results, or instead look beyond cognitive tests to 
develop better methods of assessing who is likely to succeed. 
Professor Subotnik’s view is that the goal should be to raise African 
American test scores so that they can “beat white folks at their own 
game.”311 That is a far too limited solution, and one that is premised 
upon an unreasonable, unfair, and unwise deference to cognitive-based 
testing and a flawed belief that failing to rely on cognitive test scores 
in allocating key human capital resources, such as admissions slots and 
jobs, is unfair to white people and economically harmful to the United 
States. While addressing systemic issues that lead to lower scores is 
important, we must limit our reliance on cognitive test scores that 
imperfectly predict success and fail to account for other identifiable 
factors that are important to success. The unfair and troubling 
disparate impact of cognitive tests is a warning signal. Our response 
should not be to double down on those tests, but instead to develop 
better measures of merit. 
Professor Subotnik argues that questioning the value placed upon 
cognitive-based tests in the face of their disparate impact is anti-
intellectual and represents a “race comes first” approach.312 As we 
have discussed throughout this Article, that argument adopts an ill-
informed view of merit. Cognitive-based tests are far from perfect 
predictors of success in school, in a job, or in law practice. They fail to 
account for many abilities and qualities that lead to successful 
performance. While we do not suggest cognitive abilities are 
unimportant, placing undue weight upon cognitive-based tests ill-
serves society. Although it is perhaps easy and efficient, over-reliance 
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312 Id. at 342–43. 
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upon cognitive-based testing is an intellectually lazy approach to 
determining merit in general and with respect to entry to law school 
and the legal profession. 
Society is best served when we engage in the intellectual and 
practical work necessary to examine and develop more holistic 
assessments. Doing so will both reduce the adverse impact that occurs 
when we rely solely upon cognitive test scores and produce better 
qualified students, employees and lawyers. 
